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This paper analyzes the strategic choices of a technology firm seeking to profit from innovation 
when the established product firms are better positioned to commercialize that innovation. While 
the predominant framework frames this as a choice between contracting and integration, this paper 
shows that in a context where the technology firm innovates repeatedly and has the opportunity to 
learn from its experience in the commercialization process, it may be optimal for the technology 
firm to pursue a hybrid between these two: contracting with a firm that possesses the 
complementary assets but retaining rights to participate in the commercialization process. The 
analysis is motivated by the experience of biotech firms, which in recent years have increasingly 
sought to retain the rights to participate in the marketing and sales stages of alliances with 
pharmaceutical firms (known as “co-promotion”). The paper develops a game-theoretic model of a 
technology firm choosing its strategy in this context, and uses the model to derive the conditions 
under which the firms will agree to a co-promotion (rather than a pure licensing) arrangement. It 
uses the model to explain the pattern of arrangements observed in biotech alliances, using a dataset 
of 565 alliances signed between U.S. biotech and pharmaceutical firms from 1992-2006. The results 
show that a firm is significantly more likely to enter a co-promotion arrangement when its 






ISBN 978- 87-7873-276-7 
  
INTRODUCTION 
A critical strategic decision facing a technology firm which has generated an innovation is how 
to access the complementary assets necessary to bring a product to market. According to Teece 
(1986), if the technology firm is at a disadvantage relative to the established product firms in 
accessing the complementary assets necessary to exploit the innovation but has strong 
appropriability over its innovation (so does not risk an alliance partner expropriating the 
innovation) then its optimal strategy is to contract with an established product firm to 
commercialize its innovation. The alternative – integrating downstream into the complementary 
activities – is not only likely to be costly but may also to allow imitators to catch up. 
Nevertheless, in exchange for access to the established firm’s complementary assets, the 
technology firm must share the returns from its innovation. Moreover, if it does this repeatedly 
for successive innovations it will remain in the same disadvantaged position relative to the 
established product firms and is unlikely to earn superior profits over the long term.
1  
In this paper I examine the alternative strategic choices available to a technology-based firm to 
capture returns from its innovations over the long term. In particular, I analyze the conditions 
under which it makes sense for the technology firm to pursue a hybrid arrangement between 
between these contracting and integration: contracting with a firm that possesses the 
complementary assets but retaining rights to participate in the commercialization process. The 
analysis is motivated by the experience of technology-based firms in the biopharmaceutical 
industry (i.e., biotech firms), which in recent years have sought increasingly to retain rights to 
participate in the marketing and sales process (known as “co-promotion” rights) in alliances with 
pharmaceutical firms. Executives of these firms explain this arrangement as part of a strategy by 
which they can learn about the commercialization process and thereby acquire the capabilities 
necessary to commercialize future innovations alone. 
                                                 
1 By superior profits, I mean the supernormal profits – that is, earnings above the costs of factor inputs – that 
innovators seek in return for engaging in uncertain process of innovation. These are sometimes referred to as 
Schumpeterian rents. To understand what drives the technology firm’s choice between these alternative 
commercialization strategies, I develop a game-theoretic model of a technology firm choosing its 
strategy in a dynamic context where it innovates on a repeated basis and has the opportunity to 
learn from its experience in the commercialization process. I use the model to derive the 
conditions under which both the technology firm and an established firm are likely to agree to a 
co-promotion arrangement (rather than the traditional or “pure” licensing arrangement).  
I then use the model to explain the pattern of arrangements observed in a dataset of 565 alliances 
between U.S. biotech and pharmaceutical firms signed between 1992 and 2006. The results of 
the empirical analysis show that a biotech firm is significantly more likely to negotiate a co-
promotion arrangement (rather than a pure licensing agreement) when its technological expertise 
is concentrated in areas applicable to the product field(s) of the alliance and when it is in a 
stronger financial position. These results suggest that the decision whether to enter into a co-
promotion arrangement or a pure licensing agreement involves a trade-off between the 
technology firm’s need for immediate cash and the value of acquiring the knowledge that will 
enable it to commercialize future innovations alone. 
The next section explains the relationship between this paper and the prior literature on 
technology commercialization strategy and alliance structure. I then present the model of the 
technology-based firm choosing its commercialization strategy and derive the conditions under 
which two firms are likely to agree to co-promotion. The following section describes the 
empirical analysis of a set of alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry. I conclude with some 
managerial implications. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND MOTIVATION 
The paper builds on the framework for analyzing technology commercialization strategy 
proposed by Teece (1986). Teece posed the innovating firm’s strategic choice as a decision 
between contracting with an established firm and integrating downstream to do the 
commercialization alone. He emphasized the role that the appropriability regime surrounding the 
innovation and the innovating firm’s position relative to the complementary assets play in the 
firm’s strategic choice, and argued that if the innovating firm has tight appropriability over its 
innovation but the established product firms are better positioned with respect to the complementary assets then the innovating firm’s optimal strategy is to contract with an 
established firm to commercialize the innovation. 
Nevertheless, since the innovating firm in Teece (1986) innovates only once, the framework does 
not take into account how the firm’s choice of commercialization mode might affect its options 
for commercializing future innovations. Moreover, although Teece acknowledges that the 
innovating firm may have to share profits with the holders of the complementary assets, he does 
not explain how a technology-based firm can strengthen its position and thereby overcome this 
constraint over the long term, especially when its expects to generate future innovations. Finally, 
although Teece mentions in passing that firms may use “mixed modes” in transitional phases 
(Teece, 1986, p.298), he does not explicitly consider how hybrid arrangements may enable a firm 
to capture some benefits of both contracting and self-commercialization. 
Most subsequent research building on the Teece (1986) framework has concentrated primarily on 
how the firm’s appropriability regime impacts its commercialization strategy (see, for instance, 
Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2002; Gans & Stern, 2003; Arora & Merges, 2004). One exception is 
Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier (2006), which examines how a firm may strengthen its position 
relative to the requisite complementary assets. They argue that a technology firm is unable to 
affect its position directly through a bilateral relationship with the holders of those assets, but 
may instead use venues such as standards-setting bodies to influence the industry architecture 
and thereby strengthen its position relative to the complementary assets. This paper tackles the 
same issue, but provides (and illustrates) a clear mechanism by which the technology firm can 
influence its position directly through its bilateral relationship. 
This paper also contributes to the extant literature on contracts and alliances, particularly that 
which has examined the structure of these arrangements. Williamson (1991) coined the term 
“hybrid” to describe an arrangement which involves more integration of the contracting parties’ 
activities than the classical, arm’s-length contract imagined in the law and economics literature, 
but which stops short of fully integrating the parties under one hierarchy or governance structure. 
Most of the literature which has examined the structure of these arrangements in any detail has 
analyzed how they balance mitigating contractual hazards (governance) with providing the right 
incentives for investment (Pisano, 1989; Williamson, 1991; Oxley, 1997). A parallel literature, building on the ‘property rights’ framework (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990), has 
also examined the extent to which contracts are designed to give the parties the optimal 
incentives for effort (Elfenbein & Lerner, 2003) and how their ability to do so is limited by the 
firms’ relative bargaining power or financial position (Lerner & Merges, 1998; Higgins, 2007). 
Nevertheless, although interview research (discussed below) suggests that achieving governance 
and providing incentives are relevant considerations in negotiating the contract, the evidence 
reveals that the technology firm’s primary motivation for retaining rights to participate in the 
commercialization process is acquiring the knowledge necessary to commercialize future 
products alone, which is the focus of this paper. Moreover, while previous articles which 
analyzed alliance structure have tended to abstract from the actual terms which firms explicitly 
negotiate to broadly construed variables, such as whether the alliance contains an equity 
investment (Pisano, 1989) or the allocation of an aggregate of control rights (Lerner & Merges, 
1998; Higgins, 2007), this paper follows recent work (such as Lerner & Malmendier, 2005) that 
focuses on the specific terms of these alliances that firms earnestly negotiate.   
There is a large literature on learning through alliances (Hamel, 1991; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 
1998; Oxley & Sampson, 2004), a subset of which focuses on how the structure of the alliance 
may affect learning (Kogut, 1988; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996).
2 However, this 
literature is primarily focused on horizontal, ‘knowledge sharing’ alliances (in the parlance of 
Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004) between firms with complementary technological portfolios in 
which learning from the other firm is the primary objective (e.g., international technology 
alliances). By contrast, this paper examines how the learning objective may influence the 
structure of vertical arrangements, where the primary objective is ‘accessing’ knowledge. 
Moreover it puts the learning in the context of the firm’s choice of business model for profiting 
from its innovation. 
                                                 
2 Kogut (1988) argues that joint ventures may be more effective for achieving knowledge transfer while Mowery at 
al (1996) show empirically that firms are more likely to achieve technological transfer through bilateral (vs 
unilateral) contracts.  THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In order to analyze the technology firm’s commercialization strategy in a context where it 
generates successive innovations, I develop a dynamic game-theoretic model of the technology 
firm’s choices. The model incorporates the repeated (or “dynamic”) nature of the technology 
firm’s commercialization decision, and shows how experiential learning affects that decision. 
Modeling the commercialization process also makes it possible to account explicitly for the 
strategic interaction between the technology and product firms in negotiating the terms of the 
license contract, something that has not been considered in previous, less formal analyses. 
Finally, the model makes it possible to characterize the conditions under which the parties will 
both agree to an intermediate strategy such as co-promotion. 
The set-up of the model is based on Gans (2007), which in turn builds on a framework developed 
by Segal & Whinston (2007). However, it has several significant differences. Segal & Whinston 
sought to understand how the incumbent’s behavior towards its competitors affects the 
(industry’s) overall rate of innovation, while Gans examined how the technology firm’s choice of 
commercialization mode affects its ability to innovate in future periods. By contrast, in this paper 
I seek to understand how the firm’s choice of commercialization mode affects the firm’s ability 
to capture value from its innovations over the long term. Moreover, while both Segal & 
Whinston and Gans assume that any innovation will be commercialized with certainty, in this 
paper the probability of commercialization is endogenous to the choice of commercialization in 
the current and previous periods. Furthermore, both of the earlier models imagine a situation 
where two firms are competing to become the industry incumbent, with the loser exiting the 
industry and becoming a challenger – or potential entrant – in the next period. By contrast, in the 
model presented in this paper, if the technology firm succeeds in acquiring its own 
commercialization capabilities it becomes another incumbent – in the sense that it obtains the 
same probability of commercializing an innovation as the already established product firms – 
without displacing the existing firm(s). 
Model Setup 
There are two types of firms in the model: a technology firm (T) and N identical product firms 
(P1, …, PN), each of which has specialized complementary assets in the relevant product field. The subgame in each period proceeds as follows: T generates an innovation in the relevant 
product field with probability φ.
3 T then negotiates with each of the N product firms. T may agree 
with one of the product firms to either a pure licensing arrangement (L) or a co-promotion 
arrangement (CP). Alternatively, T may decide not license the innovation (NL). Under the pure 
licensing arrangement, the product firm which wins the contract – I call that firm Pi and the other 
firms P-i – obtains the rights to commercialize the innovation in exchange for a fixed payment 
X
L, which is paid whether or not the innovation is commercialized successfully. Under the co-
promotion arrangement, T grants Pi the rights to commercialize the innovation in exchange for a 
fixed payment X
CP, but retains the right to participate in the commercialization process alongside 
Pi. If T does not license the innovation then it attempts to commercialize the innovation alone. At 
the same time, each product firm attempts to commercialize another innovation (which may be 
the result of its own internal research or obtained through a contract with a third party). Once the 
commercialization attempts have been made and the payoffs realized, the subgame repeats. 
The probability of any Pi successfully commercializing an innovation (either T’s or its own) is 
1 σ . Since Pi commercializes T’s innovation under both the licensing and co-promotion 
arrangements, the probability of successfully commercializing the innovation under either 
arrangement is  1 σ . By contrast, before T has successfully commercialized an innovation alone, 
the probability of successfully commercializing the innovation if it does so alone is  01 σ σ < . 
(Using Teece’s terminology, T is in a disadvantaged position with respect to the complementary 
assets relative to all P.) However, once T has successfully commercialized an innovation, either 
alone or as part of the co-promotion arrangement, it acquires the commercialization capabilities 
equivalent to those of an established product firm (i.e., its probability of successfully 
commercializing an innovation rises to  1 σ  in subsequent periods). 
If T’s innovation is commercialized successfully, it captures the market for itself (i.e., no other 
firm is able to earn profits from another product) and it earns profits  1 π  (in that period only).
4 
                                                 
3 That is, with probability φ the innovation occurs in the particular product field where the product firms have 
expertise (call it Z) and with probability 1-φ occurs in another product field (call it -Z). 
4 This characterization mimics the typical situation in the pharmaceutical industry where a firm with a patented 
product achieves market exclusivity for the life of the patent. However, if T’s innovation is not commercialized, then one of the product firms Pi that has 
successfully commercialized an innovation captures the market and earns profits  0 π  (i.e., each 
firm Pi that has successfully commercialized an innovation earns profits  0 π  with probability  1
M , 
where M is the number of firms which have successfully commercialized an innovation).  If no 
firm successfully commercializes an innovation then all firms earn nothing in that period.  
Implications from the model 
I use the model to derive a number of implications. First I derive several preliminary results, and 
then two testable propositions. The workings of the model and the proofs are provided in the 
Appendix. 
The first result (presented here as a lemma) confirms the basic prediction of Teece (1986) that – 
in the static technology commercialization game with no opportunity for experiential learning – 
when the established product firm is better positioned with respect to the complementary assets, 
the technology firm will choose to license the rights to commercialize its innovation to the 
established firm rather than to commercialize the innovation alone. However, it also shows that 
when this is extended to a context where the technology firm innovates repeatedly basis and has 
the opportunity to learn from its experience in the commercialization process, it may be optimal 
for the technology firm not to license the innovation. 
Lemma 1: (a) In a technology commercialization game with no experiential learning, the unique 
equilibrium outcome is where T licenses the innovation to an established product firm Pi. 
(b) In a technology commercialization game with experiential learning, not licensing will be an 
equilibrium outcome if the number of firms (N) and the probability of T commercializing a 
future innovation in the particular product field (φ) are sufficiently large. 
The second result (also presented here by way of a lemma) is that a necessary condition for co-
promotion to occur is that there must be more than one established product firm in position to 
commercialize T’s innovations. 
Lemma 2: (a) Co-promotion will be an equilibrium outcome of the technology 
commercialization game with experiential learning only if  2 N ≥ .  (b) The likelihood that T and Pi will choose to co-promote, rather than license the innovation, is 
increasing in the number of established product firms with which T could potentially contract to 
commercialize the innovation. 
The third result from the model is consistent with Aghion & Tirole’s (1994) prediction that an 
innovating firm that is financially constrained will be unable to retain control rights, even if it 
were efficient to do so. It also is also consistent with Lerner & Merges’ (1998) finding that the 
technology firm is more likely to control rights more generally if it is in a stronger financial 
position. 
Lemma 3: The likelihood that T and Pi will choose to co-promote rather than license the 
innovation is increasing in T’s financial position. 
On the basis of these preliminary results, I can derive two testable predictions for when we are 
more likely to observe co-promotion rather than pure licensing agreements. The first proposition 
relates to the nature of T’s underlying capabilities, as represented by the probability that it will 
innovate in the same product field in future (φ). 
Proposition 1: The likelihood that T and Pi will attempt to co-promote the innovation (rather T 
merely license the innovation to Pi) is increasing in the probability that T will innovate in the 
particular product field in future (φ) if the number of firms (N) and/or the probability that an 
established product firm will successfully commercializing the innovation ( 1 σ ) are sufficiently 
large. 
The second proposition relates to Pi’s capabilities, as represented by the probability that Pi will 
successfully commercialize the innovation ( 1 σ ). 
Proposition 2: The likelihood that T and Pi will attempt to co-promote the innovation (rather than 
purely license the innovation to Pi) is increasing in the probability that an established product 
firm will successfully commercializing the innovation ( 1 σ ). Hypotheses 
Lemma 1 demonstrates that, even when the established product firms are better positioned with 
respect to the complementary assets, the technology firm’s optimal strategy may not always be in 
to contract with one of the established firm to commercialize the innovation, particularly if the 
technology firm expects to generate subsequent innovations in the same product field. By 
contracting with an established product firm to commercialize successive innovations, the 
technology firm remains in a weaker position with respect to the complementary assets and 
hence has to continue sharing the returns in future periods. If instead the technology firm 
integrates downstream into the complementary assets and thereby learns about the 
commercialization process, it may be able to capture more value over the long run. 
Foregoing the opportunity to learn is not the only way that the technology firm puts itself at a 
disadvantage by licensing the innovation. As Pisano (1991) argued, if in the process of 
commercializing the innovation the established-product-firm partner develops specialized 
knowledge about the commercialization process or the product markets which is useful for 
commercializing future innovations, it may be in an even stronger bargaining position (relative to 
both the technology firm and other product firms) in future negotiations to commercialize an 
innovation. Hence a technology firm which contracts an established firm to commercialize its 
innovations on a repeated basis may become even more disadvantaged over time.  
The model also demonstrates that the technology firm may prefer a hybrid arrangement, in which 
it licenses the innovation to an established product firm but retains rights to participate in the 
commercialization process, to either pure licensing or self-commercialization. As discussed 
above, licensing an innovation to an established firm limits the technology firm’s ability to 
capture profits from its innovation. In order to overcome the constraint on its profitability that 
comes from being dependent on an established firm, the technology firm must acquire 
experience in commercialization and develop its own capabilities in commercialization. 
However, commercializing alone is expensive, and the technology firm’s inexperience means 
that it has a higher risk of failure than when it contracts with an established firm. Entering into 
this hybrid arrangement reduces the likelihood of failure in commercializing its current 
innovation. Moreover, at the same time this arrangement allows it to observe the established firm applying its specialized knowledge, to get advice on developing its own commercialization 
capabilities, and to practice using these capabilities under the established firm’s guidance. 
Hence, this arrangement is more likely than pure licensing or self-commercialization to put the 
technology firm in the position to commercialize innovations alone in future.  
Nevertheless, there are several constraints which mean that technology firms may not retain 
rights to participate in the commercialization process in every commercialization alliance, even 
in the situation where the established product firms are much better positioned with respect to the 
complementary assets. To start with, an established product firm may be unwilling to allow the 
technology firm to participate in the commercialization process. Since co-promoting an 
innovation enables the technology firm to become a product firm, this arrangement potentially 
creates a competitor which may subsequently affect the product firm’s ability to earn profits 
from its innovation.  
Nevertheless, as Lemma 3 shows, if the costs of creating a new competitor are shared among 
multiple product firms, an individual product firm may be better off agreeing to the co-
promotion arrangement. It accepts, it gets access to the innovation and is likely to pay less than if 
it had negotiated a license. Moreover, if it does not accept, one of its competitors may 
nevertheless agree to co-promote the innovation and it will not be any better off with respect to 
future competition in the downstream market. Hence, if the innovation is highly sought after, the 
technology firm may have the leverage in negotiations to retain rights to participate in the 
commercialization of an alliance product.  
A second constraint on the technology firm’s ability to negotiate a co-promotion arrangement is 
its ability to accept the lower fee, especially when the requisite fee for co-promotion effectively 
requires the technology firm to pay the product firm for allowing it to co-promote. The alliance 
contract covers a range of terms, both financial and non-financial, and there is substantial room 
to trade-off these terms in negotiations. The technology firm may be able to convince the 
established firm to grant rights to participate in the commercialization process in exchange for 
giving up a significant portion of the financial payments that it might otherwise have received. 
Nevertheless, since the technology firm often relies on the financial payments (particularly the 
upfront fees) to finance its current expenditures, its ability to trade-off financial payments for control rights depends on its financial position (among other factors). Aghion & Tirole (1994) 
predicted that a financially constrained firm may have to give up control, even when doing so 
leads to a less efficient arrangement, and Lerner & Merges (1998) found evidence consistent 
with this hypothesis. I derive a similar result in Lemma 3. 
Nevertheless, even if the technology firm has several firms competing to license its innovation 
and is in a position to give up financial payments in exchange for retaining rights, it may choose 
not co-promote the innovation because it does not foresee that acquiring commercialization 
capabilities in the product field of the alliance will not lead to compensating benefits over the 
longer term. Capabilities in product commercialization, such as expertise in marketing and sales, 
are specific to a particular product field. Moreover, building commercialization capabilities 
requires substantial investments (e.g., hiring and training a sales force) and the firm may also 
forego productivity on other tasks while this learning occurs. Hence, it is only worthwhile if the 
firm expects to generate further innovations (and hence products) in the same field in future 
These concerns, which are captured in Proposition 1, lead to the first hypothesis that I test in this 
paper: 
Hypothesis 1: A technology firm entering into an alliance to commercialize an innovation is 
more likely to enter a co-promotion arrangement (vis-à-vis a pure licensing arrangement) when it 
expects to generate innovations related to the alliance product field in future. 
A second factor affecting the technology firm’s desire to retain rights to participate in the 
commercialization process in a particular alliance is the level of expertise it expects to gain from 
its alliance partner. The level of the partner’s expertise determines not only whether the 
commercialization will be successful (which is the same whether they license or co-promote) but 
also the savings that the technology firm can potentially make if it does not have to share the 
profits with a product firm in future. Hence a technology firm is more likely to seek a co-
promotion arrangement when the expertise of its product-firm partner is higher. This is reflected 
in Proposition 2 above, and leads to the second testable hypothesis: Hypothesis 2: A technology firm entering into an alliance to commercialize an innovation is 
more likely to enter a co-promotion arrangement (vis-à-vis a pure licensing arrangement) when 
its partner has greater commercialization experience related to the product field of the alliance. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Biopharmaceutical industry 
Having used the model to derive the conditions under which we are more likely to observe co-
promotion arrangements, I apply these predictions to explain the pattern of arrangements in the 
biotech industry – more accurately called the “biopharmaceutical” industry – which applies 
biological discoveries to the development of pharmaceutical products.
5  
The biotech industry originates from the founding of Genentech in 1976 to exploit the 
recombinant DNA techniques discovered by Herbert Boyer at the University of California at San 
Francisco and Stanley Cohen at Stanford in 1972. Genentech’s first major project was a race 
with UCSF and Harvard University to clone human insulin, the key protein that diabetics need to 
normalize their metabolism (Edwards & Hamilton, 1998). The prize, which Genentech won, was 
an alliance with Lilly to commercialize the discovery (named “Humulin”) as a pharmaceutical 
product. 
The Genentech/Lilly alliance set the framework for interaction between the new “biotech” firms 
and the established pharmaceutical firms. Under a typical arrangement such as the 
Genentech/Lilly alliance, the biotech firm licensed all product rights to an established 
pharmaceutical firm. The biotech firm would remain involved through the pre-clinical stages of 
development, but then passed all responsibility for the clinical development, marketing, and 
worldwide sales to the pharmaceutical firm.  
It was not uncommon in the early alliances for the biotech firm to retain rights to some territories 
(especially its home country) or, in a few cases, rights to specific indications. For instance, at the 
same time as Genentech entered the Lilly alliance, it also signed a deal with Kabi 
                                                 
5 The biopharmaceutical or medical “biotech” industry is distinct from the agricultural and industrial “biotech” 
industries. Pharmaceutical, a Swedish firm, to commercialize human growth hormone in which it retained 
the rights to commercialize the product in the United States. At the same time, Amgen (one of 
the other industry pioneers) retained rights to sell to kidney dialysis patients in its alliance with 
Ortho Biotech to commercialize EPO.
6 Nevertheless, in these cases, the firms kept their own 
commercialization activities separate from those of their pharmaceutical firm. 
Over time the structure of these commercialization arrangements has changed significantly. As a 
first step, biotech firms sought to participate in the clinical development stages of the alliance, 
both by being involved in management of the clinical trials and by sharing in the costs (and 
thereby also the profit or loss) from clinical development. This arrangement, known as “co-
development”, implied a substantial shift downstream in the biotech firm’s alliance activities. 
More recently biotech firms have taken a step even further downstream, retaining rights to 
participate in the marketing and sales of the alliance product, and arrangement called “co-
promotion”. Error! Reference source not found. shows the trend in biotech firms entering into 
co-promotion arrangements (relative to pure licensing deals) over time. 
Insert Error! Reference source not found. here 
Under a co-promotion arrangement the biotech firm licenses the marketing rights to the 
pharmaceutical partner, but retains some rights to participate in the marketing and sales process 
alongside the partner. The two parties together develop a joint marketing strategy and sales force, 
sell under the same brand name, and pool – and ultimately split – revenues.
7 One prominent 
example is ImClone’s 2001 arrangement with Bristol-Myers Squibb to commercialize its cancer 
drug Erbitux. Another is the deal between Idec Pharmaceuticals (now part of Biogen Idec) and 
                                                 
6 In cases like the two just mentioned, the biotech firm would attempt to commercialize the product alone in the 
retained territories or indications. However, in other cases it would license these retained rights to another 
pharmaceutical firm at a later stage in the process. A popular practice was to license the product rights for Japan to a 
Japanese pharmaceutical firm at an early stage in the commercialization process, then license the remaining rights to 
a multi-national pharmaceutical firm at a later stage. The rationale was that the funds gained from the first, partial 
grant of rights enabled the firm to develop the technology through to a later stage at which it could expect to capture 
a larger share of the rents. 
7 Co-promotion can be contrasted against several other arrangements for commercializing biotech innovations. The 
most obvious contrast is the pure product license in which the biotech firm licenses all marketing & distribution 
rights to the pharmaceutical firm. However, one alternative which involves a greater degree of participation by the 
biotech firm is split territories (or, in a few cases, indications) under which the firms develop, market, and sell the 
same drug in separate (exclusive) territories. A third, if rare, alternative is co-marketing in which the firms develop, 
market, and sell the drug in same territory but with different marketing strategies, sales forces, and brand names. Genentech in 1996 for the commercialization of Rituxan, a drug for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, 
which has since become the largest selling monoclonal antibody drug and a significant 
contributor to the profits of both companies. 
Evidence from interviews 
In order to understand the motivation for entering co-promotion arrangements, I conducted a 
series of interviews with biotech firm executives who attended Recombinant Capital’s Allicense 
conference in San Francisco on May 2-3, 2006.
8 From the list of executives I selected executives 
from less-mature biotech firms whose firms either had retained co-promotion rights in recent 
agreements with established pharmaceutical firms (or more-mature biotech firms)
9 or had 
recently entered licensing agreements without retaining co-promotion rights but were likely to 
have been in a position to retain such rights.
10 I contact those executives by email and invited 
them to speak with me, either generally about why start-up biotech firms retain co-promotion 
rights in alliances or specifically about the reasons their company chose to retain (or not to 
retain) co-promotion rights in its recent agreements. I conducted phone interviews with ten 
executives during late May/early June 2006. 
The primary reason the executives cited for retaining co-promotion rights was the belief that the 
biotech firm will capture a larger share of the value from its technology if it markets the alliance 
product than if it merely licenses the marketing rights to a pharmaceutical firm. Many echoed the 
refrain that “Wall Street values ‘decision rights’ over ‘revenue rights’”.
11 They argued that 
companies which had only done licensing deals had not been very successful. Some claimed that 
the revenue the firm earned from the profit split (typically between 33% and 50%) that usually 
                                                 
8 Allicense is the primary industry conference focusing on alliances between biotech and pharmaceutical firms, and 
is attended by the senior business development executives from all the major pharmaceutical and mature biotech 
firms, as well as CEOs and other senior executives from many start-up biotech firms. 
9 In this analysis, I distinguish between mature biotech firms, such as Amgen and Genentech that already have 
pharmaceutical products on the market and are regularly licensing technologies or products in from other biotech 
firms, and less mature or “start-up” biotech firms, which do not have products on the market and are not in a 
position to commercialize their existing technologies and/or product candidates alone. 
10 I estimated the likelihood that the firm would have retained co-promotion rights through an informal inspection 
of their prior licensing experience, financial strength, and various other observable factors in Recombinant Capital’s 
Alliances database.  
11 This statement was made by Stephen R. Davis, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Neurogen, 
in his presentation at the Allicense conference in San Francisco on May 25, 2005. accompanies a co-promotion agreement was usually greater than it earns from the combination 
of upfront payments and royalties (typically in the range of 10% of net sales) that a firm can get 
from an equivalent pure-licensing deal. However, others argued that, even though a pure-
licensing agreement could be structured to produce as much income as a co-promotion 
agreement, a co-promotion arrangement gave the biotech firm greater insight into the business of 
commercializing pharmaceutical products and therefore was more valuable.  
The primary benefit the executives cited for why Wall Street rewarded co-promotion 
arrangements was that the biotech firm acquires valuable knowledge by participating in the 
commercialization process alongside the pharmaceutical firm. One executive explained that by 
retaining co-promotion rights the biotech firm is able to “piggy back” on the expertise of its 
alliance partner to build its own capabilities. Another stated that the way to “score big” was to 
“leverage the alliance partner’s expertise internally” to learn the skills necessary to develop the 
next drug.  
A secondary benefit of retaining co-promotion rights is that the firm also retains some control 
over the development and marketing process. Since neither firm knows at the outset the size of 
the potential market for the alliance product, a major concern for the biotech firm is that – if the 
product does not turn out to be sufficiently large – its alliance partner will not put in the 
resources necessary to commercialize it. Hence, it is important to have a voice at the table to 
make sure the drug gets developed on the biotech firm’s timeframe. One executive claimed that 
retaining some rights to participate in the marketing enables the firm to be “the nag that makes 
sure the drug gets developed”. Others explained that, while the deal could include “due 
diligence” or “best efforts” requirements, a lot of pharmaceutical firms would not agree to them 
because it was hard to define “best (or reasonable) efforts” and, if they did agree to such a clause, 
they were usually very vague and legally meaningless.  
Some executives claimed that their firm would always retain co-promotion rights if they could. 
However, other executives identified cases in which they would not seek co-promotion rights. If 
the firm needed cash, so was forced to enter an alliance at an early stage in the product’s 
development, then retaining co-promotion rights was not usually worth the cost (in terms of 
money foregone). One executive quipped that the “first child” of the biotech firm typically had to be sold (i.e., licensed exclusively) to a pharmaceutical firm in order to fund that and future 
products. Also, if the disease field on which the alliance product is focused was outside the 
firm’s “strategic interests”, or was in a very competitive field, then the biotech is likely to give 
up rights to the product. 
The executives also explained why they believed pharmaceutical firms were willing to give up 
marketing rights, even though marketing is their specialty. They argued that pharmaceutical 
firms often did not have the leverage (especially in negotiations over very promising 
technologies) to negotiate all the rights to market the product, and hence they were forced to 
agree to co-promotion in order to secure the biotech firm’s agreement. Nevertheless, the 
pharmaceutical firm may seek to buy those rights back – or even purchase the technology firm 
outright – if and when the product gets to market.
12 Moreover, one executive claimed that some 
companies would never agree to share marketing rights, especially when the biotech firm did not 
have the necessary experience. 
Empirical analysis 
Data 
In order to test the predictions in the model, I compiled a dataset of 565 technology 
commercialization alliance contracts signed between U.S. biotech firms and pharmaceutical 
firms between 1992 & 2006. The primary data source is the Recombinant Capital database, 
which contains detailed information on the alliances, products in clinical trials, and financing of 
biotech firms. I used the Compustat database to obtain additional information on the biotech 
firm’s financial position, namely the financial information filed with the SEC for publicly listed 
firms (where available).
13 I also used data from the NBER patent file (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 
                                                 
12 Amgen’s alliance with Abgenix is an example of this phenomenon. In July 2000 Abgenix entered a deal with 
Immunex to co-promote Abgenix’s product panitumumab, a drug for late-stage colorectal cancer therapies that was 
then in Phase I trials. However, after Amgen acquired Immunex and the product passed through Phase III trials, 
Amgen purchased Abgenix outright. One rationale for doing so is that Amgen thereby avoided having to share the 
marketing with a smaller firm. 
13 When the biotech firm was listed on a public exchange at the time it signed the alliance, I obtained this 
information in electronic form from the Compustat dataset.  When the firm was not publicly listed at the time it 
signed the alliance but had subsequently disclosed this information in an Initial Public Offering (IPO) filing 
(typically if the IPO takes place within 2-5 years of entering the alliance), I extracted this information from the 2001) to obtain information on the biotech firm’s patent portfolio. I supplemented these formal 
datasets with various pieces of data collected from web searches. 
For the purposes of this analysis, I selected deals between a U.S. start-up biotech firm and an 
established pharmaceutical firm
 that were signed between 1992 and 2006.
14 I excluded mergers 
and acquisitions, deals where that did not involve the transfer of an intellectual asset, and deals 
where the biotech firm in-licensed technology from the pharmaceutical firm. Also, in order to 
focus the analysis on similar types of alliance, I limited the analysis to alliances where the 
licensed territory included the U.S. (i.e., the biotech’s home country). After these restrictions 
were imposed, there were 565 alliances available for analysis.  
Insert Error! Reference source not found. here 
Error! Reference source not found. presents summary statistics for these alliances. It shows 
that the dataset includes deals involving products at all stages of commercialization (from 
discovery stage to approved products), as well as both biotech firms and alliance partners at 
varying stages of maturity (as reflected by both the firm age and number of prior deals). Error! 
Reference source not found. also reveals that the dataset has missing observations for several of 
the different variables. The information on firm valuation is only available when it is disclosed to 
the SEC, either because the firm was publicly listed at the time or because the firm later went 
public and included this information in its IPO filing. Meanwhile the availability of data on the 
financial terms depends on the extent to which they were disclosed in the contract filed with the 
SEC or the press release which occurred at the time of the alliance. The missing values for the 
stage of product commercialization is due to missing information in Recap’s coding. 
Insert Error! Reference source not found. here 
                                                                                                                                                             
historical balance sheet information in the firm’s IPO prospectus (stored in the Recombinant Capital database). The 
period for which I was able to observe this information depends on the information that the firm chose to disclose in 
its IPO prospectus. 
14 Since the primary purpose is to examine how biotech firms acquired the ability to market and distribute products, 
I reclassified biotech firms which were already marketing products in the disease field of the alliance as 
pharmaceutical firms. Error! Reference source not found. shows the correlations between the various variables used 
in the analysis. Panel A presents correlations between the presence of co-promotion rights and 
variables which are determined before or after the alliance is signed. Panel B presents 
correlations between the presence of co-promotion rights and other terms of the alliance. 
Empirical specification 
The empirical analysis has two parts. The first analysis examines the relationship between the 
conditions at the time the two parties signed the alliance and whether or not the biotech firm 
retained co-promotion rights. The second analysis examines the relationship between whether the 
biotech firm retained co-promotion rights and its subsequent commercialization activity. 
First analysis: Whether the biotech firm enters a co-promotion arrangement 
In the first analysis, I estimate a probit model of whether the biotech firm retained rights to co-
promote the alliance product. To measure this variable I rely on Recap’s coding of whether the 
technology firm retained co-promotion rights. Recap defines a “Co-Promotion” agreement as “a 
commercialization venture in which two or more parties promote and sell a single product, with 
each party obtaining sales revenues and/or net profits from either party's sales of the product”.
15 
The primary explanatory variables used in this analysis are motivated by Hypotheses 1 & 2: the 
biotech firm’s R&D capabilities in the alliance disease field (as per Hypothesis 1); and the 
pharmaceutical firm’s commercialization experience in the alliance disease field (as per 
Hypothesis 2).  
According to the resource-based theory of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), a firm’s 
ability to generate outputs is constrained by its existing set of resources and capabilities. Hence 
we would expect a technology firm would be most likely to generate future products in those 
product fields in which it has related research & development capabilities. Ideally I would 
measure the firm’s R&D capabilities in particular product fields using a direct measure such as 
                                                 
15 Recap codes this information whenever it is contained in the public announcement or observed in the filed 
contracts. However, they advise that this information is almost always revealed in the public announcement because 
the firms believe that it will be rewarded by the financial markets. its stock of patents. However, since patents protect an underlying technology rather than a 
specific product, it is difficult if not impossible to relate a firm’s patent stock to particular 
product fields. Hence instead I measure the biotech firm’s R&D capabilities in the disease field 
of the alliance using use two alternative measures based on its experience in prior R&D 
alliances: (1) a count of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field; and (2) the 
proportion of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field. Since the biotech firms’ 
primary activity in most alliances is R&D, the disease field to which these alliances relate ought 
to be a good predictor of the nature of the biotech firms’ underlying technological capabilities, 
and particularly the product fields to which they are most closely associated.  
I use similar variables to capture the partner’s commercialization experience in the disease field 
of the alliance. Ideally I would use direct measures of the pharmaceutical firm marketing activity 
in particular product fields. However since this information is unavailable, I instead use 
measures based on the pharmaceutical firm’s activity in prior alliances: (1) a count of partner's 
concurrent alliances in same disease field; and (2) the proportion of partner's concurrent alliances 
in same disease field. However, because the partners are established product firms whose 
marketing focus may have changed over time, in measuring the their commercialization 
expertise I consider only “concurrent” alliances, which I define to mean all alliances the 
pharmaceutical firm engaged in during the two years prior to and one year following the 
alliance.
16 
Second analysis: Biotech firm’s subsequent commercialization activity 
In the second analysis I estimate a series of models where the dependent variables are different 
measures of the biotech firm’s subsequent commercialization activity. As a first step I estimate a 
probit model of the relationship between retaining co-promotion rights and whether the biotech 
firm is directly marketing pharmaceutical products within 5 years of entering the alliance. The 
dependent variable for this analysis is an indicator of whether the biotech firm is selling products 
(under its own name) in same disease field within the next 5 years. 
                                                 
16 The reason for including alliances signed within a year after the alliance is that an alliance usually takes 6-18 
months to negotiate and during the negotiations the technology firm usually has some information on what other 
alternatives its potential partner is considering. However, since it takes 10-15 years from discovery to launch, and there is a large failure rate of 
products during the commercialization process, whether the firm is marketing products is a crude 
measure of the firm’s intentions with respect to commercialization. Moreover in some cases the 
products which the biotech firm is selling may be the result of the subject alliance, making the 
dependent variable endogenous to the type of alliance arrangement. Hence, as an alternative, I 
estimate a series of OLS models of the extent to which the biotech firm engages in 
commercialization-related activity in its subsequent deals in the 5 years after the original alliance 
was signed.
17 I use two alternative measures which attempt to capture the extent to which the 
biotech firm was engaged in the commercialization process (as opposed to the R&D process) in 
its subsequent deals: (1) an indicator of whether the biotech firm retained co-promotion rights in 
a subsequent alliance in the same disease field as the original alliance; and (2) the proportion of 
the biotech firm’s subsequent alliances in the same disease field as the alliance in which the 
biotech firm was the licensee. 
The primary explanatory variable in all these regressions is an indicator of whether the biotech 
firm retains co-promotion rights (i.e., the dependent variable in the first analysis). 
Controls 
I include control variables to capture the biotech and partner firms’ financial strength, their 
experience (namely the biotech firm’s age in years since founding), the total number of the prior 
alliances signed by both the biotech and partner firm, indicator variables for whether the 
biotech/partner had previously entered into a co-promotion alliance. I also include an index of 
the conditions of the equity markets for biotech firms at the time the alliance was signed.
18 
In order to capture the biotech firm’s financial strength, I use the firm’s most recent valuation at 
the time of the alliance.
19 For the privately held biotech firms, the valuation is the post-money 
                                                 
17 The sample of alliances for this analysis is necessarily limited to alliances that were signed from 1992-2001. 
18 Josh Lerner generously provided the index developed in Lerner (1994) and used in Lerner & Merges (1998). 
However, since the Lerner index is only calculated until 1997, I use the Amex index for 1998-2005. Both indexes 
are normalized to 100 at 12/31/1997. The correlation between these two indexes for the years they run in parallel is 
indistinguishable from 1.0000. 
19 Since I expect that the impact of financial position will increase in proportion to the total assets and shareholder’s 
equity, I use the log values of these balance sheet amounts, normalized to December 2006 dollars.  value at the time of the last round of private financing; for the publicly listed firms it is the 
market capitalization plus long term debt at the end of the prior quarter.
20 I also include the 
partner firm’s valuation (where available).  
Since the partner’s willingness to grant marketing rights may also depend on the underlying 
capabilities of the alliance partner, particularly whether the partner’s core capabilities are 
focused on technology development (i.e., a mature biotech) or commercialization (i.e., a 
pharmaceutical firm), I include an indicator for whether the alliance partner is a biotech firm. 
As the product progresses through the commercialization process, the development risk – the 
chance of the product failing – reduces and hence the biotech firm’s bargaining power is likely to 
increase. To capture this I include dummy variables for the stage of product commercialization at 
the time the alliance was signed. Moreover, since both market conditions and the popularity of 
certain therapeutic areas change over time, I include year dummies, as well as dummies for the 
year in which the firm was formed. Since the primary explanatory variables are based on the 
count and proportion of alliances in the specific disease field of the alliance, and hence are 
relative to the other firms that have alliances in that same disease field, I include dummies for the 
disease fields. 
Other alliance terms 
Whether a biotech firm retains co-promotion rights is only one part of a multi-faceted negotiation 
across a range of alliance terms. Even if the biotech firm is in a position to retain co-promotion 
rights, whether it does so depends on how it chooses to trade retaining co-promotion rights off 
against the other alliance terms. Hence in the second analysis I include a range of other variables 
to reflect the other alliance terms. 
                                                 
20 The information on firm valuation is only available when it is disclosed in filings with the SEC, either because 
the firm was publicly listed at the time or because the firm later went public and included this information in its IPO 
filing. Hence the valuation is missing for a number of firms in the dataset. To adjust for the missing values in the 
analysis, I replace the missing value with the mean of all the values for which this data is available. However, there 
is a concern that those firms missing data may be significantly weaker than the rest of the firms in the sample. To 
allow the mean of the missing values to differ from the available values, I include a dummy variable that indicates 
whether the value is missing. Mean substitution keeps all observations in the analysis without biasing the 
coefficients or standard errors on other variables. However it reduces the variance around the mean of the adjusted 
variable so may overstate the statistical significance (Hair et al., 1998). Besides the co-promotion rights, the most important terms in the alliance contract are the 
financial payments from the alliance partner to the biotech firm. Alliance contracts include a 
range of financial payments, which Recap groups into five types: upfront payments, equity 
investments, research payments, milestone payments, and royalties. The upfront payments are 
arguably the most important because they translate into cash upfront for the biotech firm. The 
equity investments can also be important because they are paid upfront and substitute for 
financing that the firm would have to raise through the external markets. Moreover, they often 
come without much sacrifice in control of the firm.
21 By contrast, the R&D payments are paid 
strictly on the basis of Full-Time-Equivalent (FTE) researcher cost, and both milestone and 
royalty payments are contingent on an event (such as the product getting to market) that is 
heavily discounted. I include the logged values of the upfront, equity, and milestone payments 
(each as separate variables) in the empirical analysis, but ignore the R&D payments because they 
translate directly to work done and are not considered “enriching” for the biotech firm.
22 
I also include indicator variables for other important non-financial terms of the agreement, 
namely: (1) whether the product license is worldwide (as opposed to just specific territories, 
including the U.S.); (2) whether the biotech firm retains rights to participate (to some degree) in 
the clinical development within a licensed territory without its expenses being fully reimbursed; 
(3) whether the parties agree to perform research and/or development activities in a single 
program (i.e., an R&D collaboration); (4) whether the biotech firm is engaged to perform R&D 
services in the discovery and/or lead stages of the alliance; (5) whether the biotech firm is 
engaged to perform R&D services in the pre-clinical or later stages of commercialization; (6) 
whether the alliance partner agrees to take minority equity stake (<50%) in the biotech firm; and 
(7) whether the biotech firm is engaged to make (or has made) the alliance product for use or sale 
by the alliance partner. 
                                                 
21 Unlike an equity investment by a venture capitalist, which is often resented for the large dilution of the founders’ 
interest, an equity investment by an alliance partner is often considered almost as good as an upfront payment 
because typically the actual share of the company taken is relatively small and it binds the partner into the success of 
the company. From the partner’s perspective it is an easier way to justify the cash payment to its own shareholders. 
22 Ideally I would also include the royalty payments in the analysis. However, the royalty rate recorded in the Recap 
database groups the true royalty rates (i.e., payments based on percentage of new sales) with transfer prices (in 
return for the manufactured product) and profit splits. Since each of these rates means very different things, 
including the raw royalty rate is likely to lead to misleading results and may bias the analysis. Results 
First analysis: Whether the biotech firm retains co-promotion rights 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  N mean s.d.  min  max 
Characteristics of biotech firm          
Years since founding (years)  565  10.51  6.41  1  36 
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  19.26  20.13  0  142 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  414  822  2,999  0.18  41,909 
Number of assigned patents (for alliances prior to 12/2002)  351  17.23  47.70  0  463.00 
          
Characteristics of partner          
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  52.13  56.85  0  257 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.56  0.50  0  1 
Biotech firm (d)  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  321  55,394 58,865  35.49  330,854 
          
Basic characteristics of the alliance          
Year alliance signed  565  1999.3 4.20  1992  2006 
Alliance filed with SEC (d)  565  0.91  0.29  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance: 
Discovery 565  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Lead molecule  565  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Preclinical 565  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Phase I  565  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Phase II  565  0.09  0.28  0  1 
Phase III  565  0.06  0.24  0  1 
BLA/NDA filed  565  0.01  0.11  0  1 
Approved for sale  565  0.03  0.18  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance:  460  2.66  2.04  1  8 
          
Relationship between alliance and firms' prior experience 
Count of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  2.94  4.61  0  28 
Proportion of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  0.20  0.28  0  1 
Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  1.84  2.60  0  19 
Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  0.13  0.22  0  1 
          
Alliance terms          
Financial terms          
Upfront payments ($M)1,3  400  9,942  21,754  0  226,405 
Equity payments ($M)1,3  304  13,072 67,909  0  1,141,079
Milestone payments ($M)1,3  352  74,626 140,202  0  905,618 
Royalty rate (max.)4  211  15.7  17.1  0  80.0 
Non-financial terms          
License is worldwide  565  0.85  0.36  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to co-promote the alliance product  565  0.21  0.40  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical development  565  0.17  0.37  0  1 
Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  565  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  565  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  565  0.31  0.46  0  1 Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner  565  0.18  0.39  0  1 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
4 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 2: Correlation matrix 
  Panel A                          
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
(1) Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance 
product (d) 
1 . 0 0                        
(2)  Biotech markets product in alliance disease field 
within 5 years (d) 
0.10 1.00                       
(3)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance (d) 
0.47 0.09 1.00                      
(4)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance in same disease field (d) 
0.67 0.16 0.71 1.00                     
(5) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee 
0.18 0.10 0.23 0.21 1.00                    
(6) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee in same disease field 
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.64 1.00                   
(7)  Years  since  founding  (log)  -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.07 1.00                  
(8)  Count of biotech's prior alliances -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.28 0.17 0.47 1.00                 
(9)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field 
0.18 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.28 1.00                
(10)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field 
0.19 0.15 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.08 -0.10 -0.18 0.59 1.00               
(11)  Count of biotech's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field2 
0.09 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.69 0.55 1.00              
(12) Proportion  of  biotech's  concurrent alliances in 
same disease field2 
0.14 0.15 0.03 0.18 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.15 0.47 0.75 0.63 1.00              
(13) Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.14 0.02 0.52 0.38 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.40 0.24 -0.06 0.07 -0.04  1.00            
(14) Biotech is publicly listed (d)  0.09 0.09 0.16 0.12 -0.05 -0.06 0.35 0.26 0.21 -0.02 0.04 -0.01  0.23 1.00                    
(15)  Biotech's  valuation  (log)1  0.01 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.34 0.15 0.21 0.40 0.01 -0.09 -0.03  -0.09  0.19 -0.03 1.00          
(16)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log) 
0.23 -0.03 0.17 0.21 0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.03  0.11 0.10 -0.01 1.00         
(17)  Count of partner's prior alliances in same disease 
field as alliance (log) 
0.21 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.09  0.14 0.08 0.07 0.53 1.00        
(18)  Proportion of partner's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance 
0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.07  0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.17 0.37 1.00       
(19)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance2 
0.22 0.03 0.18 0.26 0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.36 0.73 0.35 1.00          
(20) Proportion  of  partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance2 
0.00 0.12 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.18 0.28 0.76 0.38 1.00        
(21) Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.19 0.03 0.20 0.19 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.13 -0.08 0.57 0.31 -0.16 0.30 -0.19 1.00    
(22) Partner is a biotech firm  -0.16 -0.04 -0.14 -0.15 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.14 -0.03 -0.17 -0.03 -0.17  0.00 -0.09 0.13 -0.35 -0.05 0.18 -0.06 0.24 -0.59 1.00   
(23) Partner's valuation (log)1  0.14 -0.06 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.02  0.07 0.13 0.03 0.58 0.10 -0.29 0.08 -0.29 0.49 -0.53 1.00  
(24) Biotech equity-market index  0.14 -0.07 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.39 0.36 0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12  0.15 0.15 0.19 0.45 0.33 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.27 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 includes alliances signed in two years prior to or year following the subject alliance                 
  Panel B                
    (1)  (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33)  (34) (35)
(1)  Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance  product  (d) 1.00               
(25)  Upfront  payments  ($000)1,2  0.30  1.00              
(26)  Equity  payments  ($000)1,2  0.17  0.74  1.00             
(27)  Milestone  payments  ($000)1,2  0.41 0.57 0.50 1.00                 
(28)  Royalty  rate2  0.34 0.20 0.13 0.12 1.00               
(29)  License is worldwide  -0.12 -0.18 -0.13 -0.06 -0.32 1.00             
(30)  Biotech has right to co-develop the alliance product (d)  0.43  0.37  0.23 0.23 0.58 -0.01 1.00           
(31)  Both parties engage in joint R&D  0.05  -0.03 -0.05 0.07  -0.04 0.21  0.03  1.00         
(32)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  -0.06 -0.16 -0.04 -0.16 -0.11 0.23  -0.04 0.41  1.00       
(33)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.27 -0.06 -0.11 1.00     
(34)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  0.12 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.15 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.11  1.00  
(35)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.31 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.06 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
3 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 3: Whether Biotech Retains Co-Promotion Rights (Probit) 
  Dependent variable: Biotech retains co-promotion rights 
   
  Panel A: Characteristics of the biotech firms only 
    (1) (2) (3) 
0.018 -0.004 -0.031  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.020) 
0.825 0.733 0.926  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.270)***  (0.278)***  (0.339)*** 
-0.284 -0.390 -0.555  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.137)** (0.147)***  (0.461) 
-0.171 -0.084  0.008  (4)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log)  (0.100)*  (0.103)  (0.112) 
0.442 0.342 0.263  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.159)*** (0.172)**  (0.209) 
0.260 0.306 0.478  (6)  Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
(0.180) (0.204) (0.257)* 
0.175 0.185 0.166  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.046)*** (0.048)*** (0.066)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  565 533 515 
  Pseudo  R2  0.07 0.16 0.08 
        
  Panel B: Characteristics of the partner firm only 
    (4) (5) (6) 
0.074 0.023 0.038  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.027)***  (0.033)  (0.035) 
0.211 -0.091 -0.298  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.344)  (0.386)  (0.451) 
0.126 0.144 0.058  (10)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields  (log)  (0.081) (0.092) (0.096) 
0.018 -0.071  0.098  (11)  Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.190) (0.195) (0.208) 
0.079 0.103 0.072  (12) Partner's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.048) (0.052)**  (0.058) 
-0.264 -0.162 -0.329  (13)  Partner is biotech firm 
(0.200) (0.229) (0.260) 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  566 534 534 
  Pseudo  R2  0.16 0.27 0.14 
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings       Panel C: Other alliance terms only 
   (7)     
0.048    (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.025)*    
0.082    (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.036)**    
0.051    (16)  Milestone payments ($M)1,3 
(0.037)    
-0.474    (17) License  is  worldwide 
(0.216)**    
1.359    (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.199)***     
0.193    (19)  Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration 
(0.143)    
-0.104    (20)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials 
(0.147)    
0.329    (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.160)**    
-0.160    (22)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech 
(0.277)    
-0.266    (23)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by 
partner (0.199)     
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N    
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N    
 Observations  566     
 Pseudo  R2  0.27     
   
  Panel D: Full regression (only selected regressors shown) 
   (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.010 -0.023 -0.059  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field as the alliance  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.028)** 
0.633 0.669 1.151  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.321)**  (0.351)*  (0.475)** 
-0.477 -0.457 -1.145  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.167)*** (0.167)*** (0.542)** 
0.543 0.555 0.487  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.181)*** (0.199)*** (0.249)* 
0.114 0.112 0.135  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.054)** (0.057)** (0.072)* 
0.034 0.023 0.065  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.043) 
-0.270 -0.051  0.123  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.433)  (0.462)  (0.627) 
0.040 0.046 0.071  (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.034)** 
0.079 0.081 0.094  (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.039)** (0.040)** (0.056)* 
1.364 1.456 1.816  (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.213)***  (0.246)***  (0.319)*** 
0.293 0.293 0.529  (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.157)* (0.164)* (0.210)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
 Observations  565  533  515  Pseudo  R2  0.34  0.37  0.48 
Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%  
 presents the results of a probit regression of whether the biotech firm retained co-promotion 
rights on the various explanatory variables and controls. Panel A shows the results of the 
regressions with the characteristics of biotech firm, including the two explanatory variables 
which attempt to capture the biotech firm’s R&D activity in and focus on the disease field of the 
alliance. The various columns show the results of regressions with and without dummies and 
fixed effects. Panel B shows the results of the regressions with various characteristics of partner, 
including the two explanatory variables which capture the partner’s total activity in and focus on 
the disease field of the alliance. Panel C shows the results of the regressions with the variables 
representing the alliance terms. Panel D shows the results of the full regression (i.e., with the 
combined set of variables from Panels A-C) but reports only the variables which had significant 
coefficients. 
Insert Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  N mean s.d.  min  max 
Characteristics of biotech firm          
Years since founding (years)  565  10.51  6.41  1  36 
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  19.26  20.13  0  142 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  414  822  2,999  0.18  41,909 
Number of assigned patents (for alliances prior to 12/2002)  351  17.23  47.70  0  463.00 
          
Characteristics of partner          
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  52.13  56.85  0  257 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.56  0.50  0  1 
Biotech firm (d)  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  321  55,394 58,865  35.49  330,854 
          
Basic characteristics of the alliance          
Year alliance signed  565  1999.3 4.20  1992  2006 
Alliance filed with SEC (d)  565  0.91  0.29  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance: 
Discovery 565  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Lead molecule  565  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Preclinical 565  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Phase I  565  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Phase II  565  0.09  0.28  0  1 
Phase III  565  0.06  0.24  0  1 
BLA/NDA filed  565  0.01  0.11  0  1 
Approved for sale  565  0.03  0.18  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance:  460  2.66  2.04  1  8 
          
Relationship between alliance and firms' prior experience 
Count of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  2.94  4.61  0  28 Proportion of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  0.20  0.28  0  1 
Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  1.84  2.60  0  19 
Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  0.13  0.22  0  1 
          
Alliance terms          
Financial terms          
Upfront payments ($M)1,3  400  9,942  21,754  0  226,405 
Equity payments ($M)1,3  304  13,072 67,909  0  1,141,079
Milestone payments ($M)1,3  352  74,626 140,202  0  905,618 
Royalty rate (max.)4  211  15.7  17.1  0  80.0 
Non-financial terms          
License is worldwide  565  0.85  0.36  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to co-promote the alliance product  565  0.21  0.40  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical development  565  0.17  0.37  0  1 
Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  565  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  565  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  565  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner  565  0.18  0.39  0  1 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
4 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 2: Correlation matrix 
  Panel A                          
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
(1) Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance 
product (d) 
1 . 0 0                        
(2)  Biotech markets product in alliance disease field 
within 5 years (d) 
0.10 1.00                       
(3)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance (d) 
0.47 0.09 1.00                      
(4)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance in same disease field (d) 
0.67 0.16 0.71 1.00                     
(5) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee 
0.18 0.10 0.23 0.21 1.00                    
(6) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee in same disease field 
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.64 1.00                   
(7)  Years  since  founding  (log)  -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.07 1.00                  
(8)  Count of biotech's prior alliances -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.28 0.17 0.47 1.00                 
(9)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field 
0.18 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.28 1.00                
(10)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field 
0.19 0.15 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.08 -0.10 -0.18 0.59 1.00               
(11)  Count of biotech's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field2 
0.09 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.69 0.55 1.00              
(12) Proportion  of  biotech's  concurrent alliances in 
same disease field2 
0.14 0.15 0.03 0.18 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.15 0.47 0.75 0.63 1.00              
(13) Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.14 0.02 0.52 0.38 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.40 0.24 -0.06 0.07 -0.04  1.00            
(14) Biotech is publicly listed (d)  0.09 0.09 0.16 0.12 -0.05 -0.06 0.35 0.26 0.21 -0.02 0.04 -0.01  0.23 1.00                    
(15)  Biotech's  valuation  (log)1  0.01 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.34 0.15 0.21 0.40 0.01 -0.09 -0.03  -0.09  0.19 -0.03 1.00          
(16)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log) 
0.23 -0.03 0.17 0.21 0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.03  0.11 0.10 -0.01 1.00         
(17)  Count of partner's prior alliances in same disease 
field as alliance (log) 
0.21 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.09  0.14 0.08 0.07 0.53 1.00        
(18)  Proportion of partner's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance 
0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.07  0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.17 0.37 1.00       
(19)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance2 
0.22 0.03 0.18 0.26 0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.36 0.73 0.35 1.00          
(20) Proportion  of  partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance2 
0.00 0.12 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.18 0.28 0.76 0.38 1.00        
(21) Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.19 0.03 0.20 0.19 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.13 -0.08 0.57 0.31 -0.16 0.30 -0.19 1.00    
(22) Partner is a biotech firm  -0.16 -0.04 -0.14 -0.15 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.14 -0.03 -0.17 -0.03 -0.17  0.00 -0.09 0.13 -0.35 -0.05 0.18 -0.06 0.24 -0.59 1.00   
(23) Partner's valuation (log)1  0.14 -0.06 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.02  0.07 0.13 0.03 0.58 0.10 -0.29 0.08 -0.29 0.49 -0.53 1.00  
(24) Biotech equity-market index  0.14 -0.07 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.39 0.36 0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12  0.15 0.15 0.19 0.45 0.33 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.27 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 includes alliances signed in two years prior to or year following the subject alliance                 
  Panel B                
    (1)  (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33)  (34) (35)
(1)  Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance  product  (d) 1.00               
(25)  Upfront  payments  ($000)1,2  0.30  1.00              
(26)  Equity  payments  ($000)1,2  0.17  0.74  1.00             
(27)  Milestone  payments  ($000)1,2  0.41 0.57 0.50 1.00                 
(28)  Royalty  rate2  0.34 0.20 0.13 0.12 1.00               
(29)  License is worldwide  -0.12 -0.18 -0.13 -0.06 -0.32 1.00             
(30)  Biotech has right to co-develop the alliance product (d)  0.43  0.37  0.23 0.23 0.58 -0.01 1.00           
(31)  Both parties engage in joint R&D  0.05  -0.03 -0.05 0.07  -0.04 0.21  0.03  1.00         
(32)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  -0.06 -0.16 -0.04 -0.16 -0.11 0.23  -0.04 0.41  1.00       
(33)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.27 -0.06 -0.11 1.00     
(34)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  0.12 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.15 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.11  1.00  
(35)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.31 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.06 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
3 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 3: Whether Biotech Retains Co-Promotion Rights (Probit) 
  Dependent variable: Biotech retains co-promotion rights 
   
  Panel A: Characteristics of the biotech firms only 
    (1) (2) (3) 
0.018 -0.004 -0.031  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.020) 
0.825 0.733 0.926  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.270)***  (0.278)***  (0.339)*** 
-0.284 -0.390 -0.555  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.137)** (0.147)***  (0.461) 
-0.171 -0.084  0.008  (4)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log)  (0.100)*  (0.103)  (0.112) 
0.442 0.342 0.263  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.159)*** (0.172)**  (0.209) 
0.260 0.306 0.478  (6)  Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
(0.180) (0.204) (0.257)* 
0.175 0.185 0.166  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.046)*** (0.048)*** (0.066)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  565 533 515 
  Pseudo  R2  0.07 0.16 0.08 
        
  Panel B: Characteristics of the partner firm only 
    (4) (5) (6) 
0.074 0.023 0.038  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.027)***  (0.033)  (0.035) 
0.211 -0.091 -0.298  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.344)  (0.386)  (0.451) 
0.126 0.144 0.058  (10)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields  (log)  (0.081) (0.092) (0.096) 
0.018 -0.071  0.098  (11)  Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.190) (0.195) (0.208) 
0.079 0.103 0.072  (12) Partner's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.048) (0.052)**  (0.058) 
-0.264 -0.162 -0.329  (13)  Partner is biotech firm 
(0.200) (0.229) (0.260) 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  566 534 534 
  Pseudo  R2  0.16 0.27 0.14 
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings       Panel C: Other alliance terms only 
   (7)     
0.048    (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.025)*    
0.082    (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.036)**    
0.051    (16)  Milestone payments ($M)1,3 
(0.037)    
-0.474    (17) License  is  worldwide 
(0.216)**    
1.359    (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.199)***     
0.193    (19)  Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration 
(0.143)    
-0.104    (20)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials 
(0.147)    
0.329    (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.160)**    
-0.160    (22)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech 
(0.277)    
-0.266    (23)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by 
partner (0.199)     
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N    
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N    
 Observations  566     
 Pseudo  R2  0.27     
   
  Panel D: Full regression (only selected regressors shown) 
   (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.010 -0.023 -0.059  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field as the alliance  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.028)** 
0.633 0.669 1.151  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.321)**  (0.351)*  (0.475)** 
-0.477 -0.457 -1.145  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.167)*** (0.167)*** (0.542)** 
0.543 0.555 0.487  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.181)*** (0.199)*** (0.249)* 
0.114 0.112 0.135  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.054)** (0.057)** (0.072)* 
0.034 0.023 0.065  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.043) 
-0.270 -0.051  0.123  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.433)  (0.462)  (0.627) 
0.040 0.046 0.071  (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.034)** 
0.079 0.081 0.094  (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.039)** (0.040)** (0.056)* 
1.364 1.456 1.816  (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.213)***  (0.246)***  (0.319)*** 
0.293 0.293 0.529  (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.157)* (0.164)* (0.210)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
 Observations  565  533  515  Pseudo  R2  0.34  0.37  0.48 
Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%  
 here 
The results show a strong relationship between the proportion of the biotech firm’s prior 
alliances in the disease field of the alliance (line 2) and whether the biotech firm retained co-
promotion rights. Having a prior co-promotion alliance (line 7) is also positively correlated with 
retaining co-promotion rights. The likelihood of retaining co-promotion rights increases with its 
valuation (line 7). The variables representing the characteristics of the partner or capabilities in 
and focus on the disease field of the alliance are generally not significant. A firm which retains 
co-promotion rights is also likely to negotiate stronger upfront and equity payments, to retain 
rights to participate in the clinical development process, and to do R&D related to the clinical 
trials.  
Second analysis: The biotech firm’s subsequent commercialization activity 
Table 4: Biotech’s Subsequent Commercialization Activity (Probit) 
  Dependent variable: Biotech firm markets product in alliance disease field within 5 years (d) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
Full sample 
(1992-2006) 
Sample without truncation 
(1992-2001) 
0.439 0.202 0.640 0.560  (1)  Biotech retains rights to co-promote the 
alliance product  (0.194)** (0.233)  (0.240)***  (0.300)* 
 0.050   0.138  (2)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance    (0.027)*    (0.048)*** 
 0.222   -0.792  (3)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance    (0.458)    (0.593) 
 0.101   0.176  (4) Years since founding (log) 
 (0.355)   (0.401) 
 -0.064   -0.073  (5)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all 
disease fields (log)    (0.243)    (0.230) 
 -0.202   -0.482  (6) Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
 (0.298)   (0.401) 
 -0.103   0.118  (7) Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
 (0.330)   (0.356) 
 0.098   -0.066  (8) Biotech's valuation (log) 
 (0.080)   (0.090) 
  Stage of commercialization dummies  N  Y  N  Y 
  Constant  -1.751 -2.470 -1.696 -2.246 
    (0.107)*** (0.745)*** (0.120)*** (0.721)*** 
  Observations  566 565 389 388 
  Adjusted  R2  0.02 0.24 0.04 0.25 
Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%  presents the results of a probit regression of whether the biotech firm is marketing a product 
within 5 years in the disease field of the alliance. Columns (1) and (2) show the results using the 
full sample. However, since this variable will be truncated for those alliances signed within the 
past 5 years, Columns (3) and (4) show the same analysis repeated on the subset of alliances 
signed between 1992 and 2001. The results show a strong relationship between retaining co-
promotion rights and the likelihood of the firm marketing a future product. Moreover this 
relationship persists after controlling for other factors related to the firm’s experience, both 
generally and in the disease field, that are likely to be correlated with the firm being in the 
position to integrate downstream. 
Insert Table 4: Biotech’s Subsequent Commercialization Activity (Probit) 
  Dependent variable: Biotech firm markets product in alliance disease field within 5 years (d) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
Full sample 
(1992-2006) 
Sample without truncation 
(1992-2001) 
0.439 0.202 0.640 0.560  (1)  Biotech retains rights to co-promote the 
alliance product  (0.194)**  (0.233)  (0.240)***  (0.300)* 
 0.050   0.138  (2)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance    (0.027)*    (0.048)*** 
 0.222   -0.792  (3)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance    (0.458)    (0.593) 
 0.101   0.176  (4) Years since founding (log) 
 (0.355)   (0.401) 
 -0.064   -0.073  (5)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all 
disease fields (log)    (0.243)    (0.230) 
 -0.202   -0.482  (6) Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
 (0.298)   (0.401) 
 -0.103   0.118  (7) Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
 (0.330)   (0.356) 
 0.098   -0.066  (8) Biotech's valuation (log) 
 (0.080)   (0.090) 
  Stage of commercialization dummies  N  Y  N  Y 
  Constant  -1.751 -2.470 -1.696 -2.246 
    (0.107)*** (0.745)*** (0.120)*** (0.721)*** 
  Observations  566 565 389 388 
  Adjusted  R2  0.02 0.24 0.04 0.25 
Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%  here 
Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions of 4 measures of the biotech firm’s participation 
in the commercialization process in subsequent alliances. The results show that, by each of the 4 
measures, there is a positive and highly significant relationship between retaining co-promotion 
rights and the likelihood of the firm participating in the commercialization process in subsequent 
alliances. A biotech firm is significantly more likely to retain co-promotion rights and to be a 
licensee (i.e., to in-license technology), both generally and in the same disease field, in 
subsequent alliances. 
Insert Table 5 here 
Discussion 
Hypothesized effects 
The strong relationship between entering into a co-promotion alliance and the proportion of the 
firm’s prior (R&D-related) activity in the alliance disease field(s) in Table 1: Descriptive 
statistics 
  N mean s.d.  min  max 
Characteristics of biotech firm          
Years since founding (years)  565  10.51  6.41  1  36 
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  19.26  20.13  0  142 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  414  822  2,999  0.18  41,909 
Number of assigned patents (for alliances prior to 12/2002)  351  17.23  47.70  0  463.00 
          
Characteristics of partner          
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  52.13  56.85  0  257 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.56  0.50  0  1 
Biotech firm (d)  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  321  55,394 58,865  35.49  330,854 
          
Basic characteristics of the alliance          
Year alliance signed  565  1999.3 4.20  1992  2006 
Alliance filed with SEC (d)  565  0.91  0.29  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance: 
Discovery 565  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Lead molecule  565  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Preclinical 565  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Phase I  565  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Phase II  565  0.09  0.28  0  1 
Phase III  565  0.06  0.24  0  1 
BLA/NDA filed  565  0.01  0.11  0  1 Approved for sale  565  0.03  0.18  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance:  460  2.66  2.04  1  8 
          
Relationship between alliance and firms' prior experience 
Count of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  2.94  4.61  0  28 
Proportion of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  0.20  0.28  0  1 
Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  1.84  2.60  0  19 
Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  0.13  0.22  0  1 
          
Alliance terms          
Financial terms          
Upfront payments ($M)1,3  400  9,942  21,754  0  226,405 
Equity payments ($M)1,3  304  13,072 67,909  0  1,141,079
Milestone payments ($M)1,3  352  74,626 140,202  0  905,618 
Royalty rate (max.)4  211  15.7  17.1  0  80.0 
Non-financial terms          
License is worldwide  565  0.85  0.36  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to co-promote the alliance product  565  0.21  0.40  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical development  565  0.17  0.37  0  1 
Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  565  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  565  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  565  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner  565  0.18  0.39  0  1 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
4 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 2: Correlation matrix 
  Panel A                          
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
(1) Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance 
product (d) 
1 . 0 0                        
(2)  Biotech markets product in alliance disease field 
within 5 years (d) 
0.10 1.00                       
(3)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance (d) 
0.47 0.09 1.00                      
(4)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance in same disease field (d) 
0.67 0.16 0.71 1.00                     
(5) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee 
0.18 0.10 0.23 0.21 1.00                    
(6) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee in same disease field 
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.64 1.00                   
(7)  Years  since  founding  (log)  -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.07 1.00                  
(8)  Count of biotech's prior alliances -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.28 0.17 0.47 1.00                 
(9)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field 
0.18 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.28 1.00                
(10)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field 
0.19 0.15 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.08 -0.10 -0.18 0.59 1.00               
(11)  Count of biotech's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field2 
0.09 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.69 0.55 1.00              
(12) Proportion  of  biotech's  concurrent alliances in 
same disease field2 
0.14 0.15 0.03 0.18 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.15 0.47 0.75 0.63 1.00              
(13) Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.14 0.02 0.52 0.38 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.40 0.24 -0.06 0.07 -0.04  1.00            
(14) Biotech is publicly listed (d)  0.09 0.09 0.16 0.12 -0.05 -0.06 0.35 0.26 0.21 -0.02 0.04 -0.01  0.23 1.00                    
(15)  Biotech's  valuation  (log)1  0.01 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.34 0.15 0.21 0.40 0.01 -0.09 -0.03  -0.09  0.19 -0.03 1.00          
(16)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log) 
0.23 -0.03 0.17 0.21 0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.03  0.11 0.10 -0.01 1.00         
(17)  Count of partner's prior alliances in same disease 
field as alliance (log) 
0.21 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.09  0.14 0.08 0.07 0.53 1.00        
(18)  Proportion of partner's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance 
0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.07  0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.17 0.37 1.00       
(19)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance2 
0.22 0.03 0.18 0.26 0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.36 0.73 0.35 1.00          
(20) Proportion  of  partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance2 
0.00 0.12 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.18 0.28 0.76 0.38 1.00        
(21) Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.19 0.03 0.20 0.19 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.13 -0.08 0.57 0.31 -0.16 0.30 -0.19 1.00    
(22) Partner is a biotech firm  -0.16 -0.04 -0.14 -0.15 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.14 -0.03 -0.17 -0.03 -0.17  0.00 -0.09 0.13 -0.35 -0.05 0.18 -0.06 0.24 -0.59 1.00   
(23) Partner's valuation (log)1  0.14 -0.06 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.02  0.07 0.13 0.03 0.58 0.10 -0.29 0.08 -0.29 0.49 -0.53 1.00  
(24) Biotech equity-market index  0.14 -0.07 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.39 0.36 0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12  0.15 0.15 0.19 0.45 0.33 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.27 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 includes alliances signed in two years prior to or year following the subject alliance                 
  Panel B                
    (1)  (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33)  (34) (35)
(1)  Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance  product  (d) 1.00               
(25)  Upfront  payments  ($000)1,2  0.30  1.00              
(26)  Equity  payments  ($000)1,2  0.17  0.74  1.00             
(27)  Milestone  payments  ($000)1,2  0.41 0.57 0.50 1.00                 
(28)  Royalty  rate2  0.34 0.20 0.13 0.12 1.00               
(29)  License is worldwide  -0.12 -0.18 -0.13 -0.06 -0.32 1.00             
(30)  Biotech has right to co-develop the alliance product (d)  0.43  0.37  0.23 0.23 0.58 -0.01 1.00           
(31)  Both parties engage in joint R&D  0.05  -0.03 -0.05 0.07  -0.04 0.21  0.03  1.00         
(32)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  -0.06 -0.16 -0.04 -0.16 -0.11 0.23  -0.04 0.41  1.00       
(33)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.27 -0.06 -0.11 1.00     
(34)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  0.12 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.15 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.11  1.00  
(35)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.31 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.06 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
3 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 3: Whether Biotech Retains Co-Promotion Rights (Probit) 
  Dependent variable: Biotech retains co-promotion rights 
   
  Panel A: Characteristics of the biotech firms only 
    (1) (2) (3) 
0.018 -0.004 -0.031  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.020) 
0.825 0.733 0.926  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.270)***  (0.278)***  (0.339)*** 
-0.284 -0.390 -0.555  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.137)** (0.147)***  (0.461) 
-0.171 -0.084  0.008  (4)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log)  (0.100)*  (0.103)  (0.112) 
0.442 0.342 0.263  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.159)*** (0.172)**  (0.209) 
0.260 0.306 0.478  (6)  Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
(0.180) (0.204) (0.257)* 
0.175 0.185 0.166  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.046)*** (0.048)*** (0.066)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  565 533 515 
  Pseudo  R2  0.07 0.16 0.08 
        
  Panel B: Characteristics of the partner firm only 
    (4) (5) (6) 
0.074 0.023 0.038  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.027)***  (0.033)  (0.035) 
0.211 -0.091 -0.298  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.344)  (0.386)  (0.451) 
0.126 0.144 0.058  (10)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields  (log)  (0.081) (0.092) (0.096) 
0.018 -0.071  0.098  (11)  Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.190) (0.195) (0.208) 
0.079 0.103 0.072  (12) Partner's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.048) (0.052)**  (0.058) 
-0.264 -0.162 -0.329  (13)  Partner is biotech firm 
(0.200) (0.229) (0.260) 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  566 534 534 
  Pseudo  R2  0.16 0.27 0.14 
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings       Panel C: Other alliance terms only 
   (7)     
0.048    (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.025)*    
0.082    (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.036)**    
0.051    (16)  Milestone payments ($M)1,3 
(0.037)    
-0.474    (17) License  is  worldwide 
(0.216)**    
1.359    (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.199)***     
0.193    (19)  Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration 
(0.143)    
-0.104    (20)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials 
(0.147)    
0.329    (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.160)**    
-0.160    (22)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech 
(0.277)    
-0.266    (23)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by 
partner (0.199)     
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N    
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N    
 Observations  566     
 Pseudo  R2  0.27     
   
  Panel D: Full regression (only selected regressors shown) 
   (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.010 -0.023 -0.059  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field as the alliance  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.028)** 
0.633 0.669 1.151  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.321)**  (0.351)*  (0.475)** 
-0.477 -0.457 -1.145  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.167)*** (0.167)*** (0.542)** 
0.543 0.555 0.487  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.181)*** (0.199)*** (0.249)* 
0.114 0.112 0.135  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.054)** (0.057)** (0.072)* 
0.034 0.023 0.065  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.043) 
-0.270 -0.051  0.123  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.433)  (0.462)  (0.627) 
0.040 0.046 0.071  (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.034)** 
0.079 0.081 0.094  (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.039)** (0.040)** (0.056)* 
1.364 1.456 1.816  (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.213)***  (0.246)***  (0.319)*** 
0.293 0.293 0.529  (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.157)* (0.164)* (0.210)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
 Observations  565  533  515  Pseudo  R2  0.34  0.37  0.48 
Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%  
 provides some support for Hypothesis 1. Interestingly, while the proportion of R&D activity in a 
particular area is significant, the total stock is not. This suggests that the primary determinant of 
whether a firm retains co-promotion rights is the degree to which the firm is focused on the 
particular disease area. If the firm’s R&D capabilities are focused on that disease area then it is 
likely to foresee that its future products will be in that disease area. Therefore it will be 
worthwhile to invest in retaining co-promotion rights and learning about the commercialization 
process because it is likely to be in the position to commercialize future products in that area. By 
contrast, if the firm’s R&D expertise is focused in other areas then – even if it is generating 
many potential products and therefore engaging in many alliances in this area – it may be 
concentrating its efforts on building its commercialization capabilities in those other areas. 
Alternatively, if the firm’s R&D expertise is dispersed across multiple areas then it may be 
choosing to remain a technology-based firm and therefore have no interest in retaining co-
promotion rights. 
The results in Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  N mean s.d.  min  max 
Characteristics of biotech firm          
Years since founding (years)  565  10.51  6.41  1  36 
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  19.26  20.13  0  142 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  414  822  2,999  0.18  41,909 
Number of assigned patents (for alliances prior to 12/2002)  351  17.23  47.70  0  463.00 
          
Characteristics of partner          
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  52.13  56.85  0  257 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.56  0.50  0  1 
Biotech firm (d)  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  321  55,394 58,865  35.49  330,854 
          
Basic characteristics of the alliance          
Year alliance signed  565  1999.3 4.20  1992  2006 
Alliance filed with SEC (d)  565  0.91  0.29  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance: 
Discovery 565  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Lead molecule  565  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Preclinical 565  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Phase I  565  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Phase II  565  0.09  0.28  0  1 
Phase III  565  0.06  0.24  0  1 
BLA/NDA filed  565  0.01  0.11  0  1 
Approved for sale  565  0.03  0.18  0  1 Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance:  460  2.66  2.04  1  8 
          
Relationship between alliance and firms' prior experience 
Count of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  2.94  4.61  0  28 
Proportion of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  0.20  0.28  0  1 
Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  1.84  2.60  0  19 
Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  0.13  0.22  0  1 
          
Alliance terms          
Financial terms          
Upfront payments ($M)1,3  400  9,942  21,754  0  226,405 
Equity payments ($M)1,3  304  13,072 67,909  0  1,141,079
Milestone payments ($M)1,3  352  74,626 140,202  0  905,618 
Royalty rate (max.)4  211  15.7  17.1  0  80.0 
Non-financial terms          
License is worldwide  565  0.85  0.36  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to co-promote the alliance product  565  0.21  0.40  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical development  565  0.17  0.37  0  1 
Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  565  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  565  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  565  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner  565  0.18  0.39  0  1 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
4 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 2: Correlation matrix 
  Panel A                          
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
(1) Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance 
product (d) 
1 . 0 0                        
(2)  Biotech markets product in alliance disease field 
within 5 years (d) 
0.10 1.00                       
(3)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance (d) 
0.47 0.09 1.00                      
(4)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance in same disease field (d) 
0.67 0.16 0.71 1.00                     
(5) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee 
0.18 0.10 0.23 0.21 1.00                    
(6) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee in same disease field 
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.64 1.00                   
(7)  Years  since  founding  (log)  -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.07 1.00                  
(8)  Count of biotech's prior alliances -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.28 0.17 0.47 1.00                 
(9)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field 
0.18 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.28 1.00                
(10)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field 
0.19 0.15 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.08 -0.10 -0.18 0.59 1.00               
(11)  Count of biotech's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field2 
0.09 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.69 0.55 1.00              
(12) Proportion  of  biotech's  concurrent alliances in 
same disease field2 
0.14 0.15 0.03 0.18 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.15 0.47 0.75 0.63 1.00              
(13) Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.14 0.02 0.52 0.38 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.40 0.24 -0.06 0.07 -0.04  1.00            
(14) Biotech is publicly listed (d)  0.09 0.09 0.16 0.12 -0.05 -0.06 0.35 0.26 0.21 -0.02 0.04 -0.01  0.23 1.00                    
(15)  Biotech's  valuation  (log)1  0.01 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.34 0.15 0.21 0.40 0.01 -0.09 -0.03  -0.09  0.19 -0.03 1.00          
(16)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log) 
0.23 -0.03 0.17 0.21 0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.03  0.11 0.10 -0.01 1.00         
(17)  Count of partner's prior alliances in same disease 
field as alliance (log) 
0.21 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.09  0.14 0.08 0.07 0.53 1.00        
(18)  Proportion of partner's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance 
0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.07  0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.17 0.37 1.00       
(19)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance2 
0.22 0.03 0.18 0.26 0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.36 0.73 0.35 1.00          
(20) Proportion  of  partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance2 
0.00 0.12 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.18 0.28 0.76 0.38 1.00        
(21) Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.19 0.03 0.20 0.19 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.13 -0.08 0.57 0.31 -0.16 0.30 -0.19 1.00    
(22) Partner is a biotech firm  -0.16 -0.04 -0.14 -0.15 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.14 -0.03 -0.17 -0.03 -0.17  0.00 -0.09 0.13 -0.35 -0.05 0.18 -0.06 0.24 -0.59 1.00   
(23) Partner's valuation (log)1  0.14 -0.06 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.02  0.07 0.13 0.03 0.58 0.10 -0.29 0.08 -0.29 0.49 -0.53 1.00  
(24) Biotech equity-market index  0.14 -0.07 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.39 0.36 0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12  0.15 0.15 0.19 0.45 0.33 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.27 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 includes alliances signed in two years prior to or year following the subject alliance                 
  Panel B                
    (1)  (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33)  (34) (35)
(1)  Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance  product  (d) 1.00               
(25)  Upfront  payments  ($000)1,2  0.30  1.00              
(26)  Equity  payments  ($000)1,2  0.17  0.74  1.00             
(27)  Milestone  payments  ($000)1,2  0.41 0.57 0.50 1.00                 
(28)  Royalty  rate2  0.34 0.20 0.13 0.12 1.00               
(29)  License is worldwide  -0.12 -0.18 -0.13 -0.06 -0.32 1.00             
(30)  Biotech has right to co-develop the alliance product (d)  0.43  0.37  0.23 0.23 0.58 -0.01 1.00           
(31)  Both parties engage in joint R&D  0.05  -0.03 -0.05 0.07  -0.04 0.21  0.03  1.00         
(32)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  -0.06 -0.16 -0.04 -0.16 -0.11 0.23  -0.04 0.41  1.00       
(33)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.27 -0.06 -0.11 1.00     
(34)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  0.12 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.15 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.11  1.00  
(35)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.31 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.06 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
3 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 3: Whether Biotech Retains Co-Promotion Rights (Probit) 
  Dependent variable: Biotech retains co-promotion rights 
   
  Panel A: Characteristics of the biotech firms only 
    (1) (2) (3) 
0.018 -0.004 -0.031  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.020) 
0.825 0.733 0.926  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.270)***  (0.278)***  (0.339)*** 
-0.284 -0.390 -0.555  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.137)** (0.147)***  (0.461) 
-0.171 -0.084  0.008  (4)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log)  (0.100)*  (0.103)  (0.112) 
0.442 0.342 0.263  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.159)*** (0.172)**  (0.209) 
0.260 0.306 0.478  (6)  Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
(0.180) (0.204) (0.257)* 
0.175 0.185 0.166  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.046)*** (0.048)*** (0.066)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  565 533 515 
  Pseudo  R2  0.07 0.16 0.08 
        
  Panel B: Characteristics of the partner firm only 
    (4) (5) (6) 
0.074 0.023 0.038  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.027)***  (0.033)  (0.035) 
0.211 -0.091 -0.298  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.344)  (0.386)  (0.451) 
0.126 0.144 0.058  (10)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields  (log)  (0.081) (0.092) (0.096) 
0.018 -0.071  0.098  (11)  Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.190) (0.195) (0.208) 
0.079 0.103 0.072  (12) Partner's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.048) (0.052)**  (0.058) 
-0.264 -0.162 -0.329  (13)  Partner is biotech firm 
(0.200) (0.229) (0.260) 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  566 534 534 
  Pseudo  R2  0.16 0.27 0.14 
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings       Panel C: Other alliance terms only 
   (7)     
0.048    (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.025)*    
0.082    (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.036)**    
0.051    (16)  Milestone payments ($M)1,3 
(0.037)    
-0.474    (17) License  is  worldwide 
(0.216)**    
1.359    (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.199)***     
0.193    (19)  Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration 
(0.143)    
-0.104    (20)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials 
(0.147)    
0.329    (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.160)**    
-0.160    (22)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech 
(0.277)    
-0.266    (23)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by 
partner (0.199)     
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N    
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N    
 Observations  566     
 Pseudo  R2  0.27     
   
  Panel D: Full regression (only selected regressors shown) 
   (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.010 -0.023 -0.059  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field as the alliance  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.028)** 
0.633 0.669 1.151  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.321)**  (0.351)*  (0.475)** 
-0.477 -0.457 -1.145  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.167)*** (0.167)*** (0.542)** 
0.543 0.555 0.487  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.181)*** (0.199)*** (0.249)* 
0.114 0.112 0.135  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.054)** (0.057)** (0.072)* 
0.034 0.023 0.065  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.043) 
-0.270 -0.051  0.123  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.433)  (0.462)  (0.627) 
0.040 0.046 0.071  (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.034)** 
0.079 0.081 0.094  (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.039)** (0.040)** (0.056)* 
1.364 1.456 1.816  (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.213)***  (0.246)***  (0.319)*** 
0.293 0.293 0.529  (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.157)* (0.164)* (0.210)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
 Observations  565  533  515  Pseudo  R2  0.34  0.37  0.48 
Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%  
 show no relationship between entering into a co-promotion arrangement and either the partner’s 
total activity in or focus on the disease field of the alliance (as is predicted in Hypothesis 2). This 
finding is on the face surprising since the model predicts that a biotech firm is more likely to 
retain co-promotion rights when its partner has stronger capabilities in the product field. 
However, this result may possibly be explained by the fact that neither the model nor the 
empirical analysis take into account the implications of the pre-contractual matching between the 
biotech firm and its partner. Those pharmaceutical firms which have significant capabilities in a 
particular disease area are likely to be more desirable partners and therefore will be in a stronger 
bargaining position compared to other pharmaceutical firms. As a consequence such a firm may 
have less need to grant co-promotion rights in order to induce the biotech firm to enter in the 
alliance. Therefore the biotech firm may choose to trade-off retaining co-promotion rights for the 
benefits of attracting a highly skilled pharmaceutical firm as partner. 
The significant results on the indicator for a co-promotion arrangement in line 1 of Table 4: 
Biotech’s Subsequent Commercialization Activity (Probit) 
  Dependent variable: Biotech firm markets product in alliance disease field within 5 years (d) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
Full sample 
(1992-2006) 
Sample without truncation 
(1992-2001) 
0.439 0.202 0.640 0.560  (1)  Biotech retains rights to co-promote the 
alliance product  (0.194)** (0.233)  (0.240)***  (0.300)* 
 0.050   0.138  (2)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance    (0.027)*    (0.048)*** 
 0.222   -0.792  (3)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance    (0.458)    (0.593) 
 0.101   0.176  (4) Years since founding (log) 
 (0.355)   (0.401) 
 -0.064   -0.073  (5)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all 
disease fields (log)    (0.243)    (0.230) 
 -0.202   -0.482  (6) Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
 (0.298)   (0.401) 
 -0.103   0.118  (7) Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
 (0.330)   (0.356) 
 0.098   -0.066  (8) Biotech's valuation (log) 
 (0.080)   (0.090) 
  Stage of commercialization dummies  N  Y  N  Y 
  Constant  -1.751 -2.470 -1.696 -2.246 
    (0.107)*** (0.745)*** (0.120)*** (0.721)*** 
  Observations  566 565 389 388 
  Adjusted  R2  0.02 0.24 0.04 0.25 Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%  and Table 5 provide support for the argument that the reason that biotech firms enter into a co-
promotion arrangement in order to acquire the capabilities to commercialize future products. The 
empirical evidence shows that biotech firms that retain co-promotion rights are more likely to be 
marketing products – or at least engaged in the commercialization-related activity of future 
alliances – in future than firms which do not. However, it does not show whether retaining co-
promotion rights is what actually caused them to be marketing products or engaged in the 
commercialization-related activity of future alliances. It is possible that these firms had already 
set on a strategy of integrating downstream into commercialization and retaining co-promotion 
rights was merely a step along this path. 
Other effects 
The results in line 7 of Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  N mean s.d.  min  max 
Characteristics of biotech firm          
Years since founding (years)  565  10.51  6.41  1  36 
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  19.26  20.13  0  142 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  414  822  2,999  0.18  41,909 
Number of assigned patents (for alliances prior to 12/2002)  351  17.23  47.70  0  463.00 
          
Characteristics of partner          
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  52.13  56.85  0  257 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.56  0.50  0  1 
Biotech firm (d)  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  321  55,394 58,865  35.49  330,854 
          
Basic characteristics of the alliance          
Year alliance signed  565  1999.3 4.20  1992  2006 
Alliance filed with SEC (d)  565  0.91  0.29  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance: 
Discovery 565  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Lead molecule  565  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Preclinical 565  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Phase I  565  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Phase II  565  0.09  0.28  0  1 
Phase III  565  0.06  0.24  0  1 
BLA/NDA filed  565  0.01  0.11  0  1 
Approved for sale  565  0.03  0.18  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance:  460  2.66  2.04  1  8 
          
Relationship between alliance and firms' prior experience 
Count of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  2.94  4.61  0  28 
Proportion of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  0.20  0.28  0  1 
Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  1.84  2.60  0  19 
Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  0.13  0.22  0  1 
          Alliance terms          
Financial terms          
Upfront payments ($M)1,3  400  9,942  21,754  0  226,405 
Equity payments ($M)1,3  304  13,072 67,909  0  1,141,079
Milestone payments ($M)1,3  352  74,626 140,202  0  905,618 
Royalty rate (max.)4  211  15.7  17.1  0  80.0 
Non-financial terms          
License is worldwide  565  0.85  0.36  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to co-promote the alliance product  565  0.21  0.40  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical development  565  0.17  0.37  0  1 
Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  565  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  565  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  565  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner  565  0.18  0.39  0  1 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
4 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 2: Correlation matrix 
  Panel A                          
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
(1) Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance 
product (d) 
1 . 0 0                        
(2)  Biotech markets product in alliance disease field 
within 5 years (d) 
0.10 1.00                       
(3)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance (d) 
0.47 0.09 1.00                      
(4)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance in same disease field (d) 
0.67 0.16 0.71 1.00                     
(5) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee 
0.18 0.10 0.23 0.21 1.00                    
(6) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee in same disease field 
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.64 1.00                   
(7)  Years  since  founding  (log)  -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.07 1.00                  
(8)  Count of biotech's prior alliances -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.28 0.17 0.47 1.00                 
(9)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field 
0.18 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.28 1.00                
(10)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field 
0.19 0.15 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.08 -0.10 -0.18 0.59 1.00               
(11)  Count of biotech's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field2 
0.09 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.69 0.55 1.00              
(12) Proportion  of  biotech's  concurrent alliances in 
same disease field2 
0.14 0.15 0.03 0.18 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.15 0.47 0.75 0.63 1.00              
(13) Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.14 0.02 0.52 0.38 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.40 0.24 -0.06 0.07 -0.04  1.00            
(14) Biotech is publicly listed (d)  0.09 0.09 0.16 0.12 -0.05 -0.06 0.35 0.26 0.21 -0.02 0.04 -0.01  0.23 1.00                    
(15)  Biotech's  valuation  (log)1  0.01 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.34 0.15 0.21 0.40 0.01 -0.09 -0.03  -0.09  0.19 -0.03 1.00          
(16)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log) 
0.23 -0.03 0.17 0.21 0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.03  0.11 0.10 -0.01 1.00         
(17)  Count of partner's prior alliances in same disease 
field as alliance (log) 
0.21 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.09  0.14 0.08 0.07 0.53 1.00        
(18)  Proportion of partner's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance 
0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.07  0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.17 0.37 1.00       
(19)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance2 
0.22 0.03 0.18 0.26 0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.36 0.73 0.35 1.00          
(20) Proportion  of  partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance2 
0.00 0.12 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.18 0.28 0.76 0.38 1.00        
(21) Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.19 0.03 0.20 0.19 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.13 -0.08 0.57 0.31 -0.16 0.30 -0.19 1.00    
(22) Partner is a biotech firm  -0.16 -0.04 -0.14 -0.15 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.14 -0.03 -0.17 -0.03 -0.17  0.00 -0.09 0.13 -0.35 -0.05 0.18 -0.06 0.24 -0.59 1.00   
(23) Partner's valuation (log)1  0.14 -0.06 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.02  0.07 0.13 0.03 0.58 0.10 -0.29 0.08 -0.29 0.49 -0.53 1.00  
(24) Biotech equity-market index  0.14 -0.07 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.39 0.36 0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12  0.15 0.15 0.19 0.45 0.33 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.27 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 includes alliances signed in two years prior to or year following the subject alliance                 
  Panel B                
    (1)  (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33)  (34) (35)
(1)  Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance  product  (d) 1.00               
(25)  Upfront  payments  ($000)1,2  0.30  1.00              
(26)  Equity  payments  ($000)1,2  0.17  0.74  1.00             
(27)  Milestone  payments  ($000)1,2  0.41 0.57 0.50 1.00                 
(28)  Royalty  rate2  0.34 0.20 0.13 0.12 1.00               
(29)  License is worldwide  -0.12 -0.18 -0.13 -0.06 -0.32 1.00             
(30)  Biotech has right to co-develop the alliance product (d)  0.43  0.37  0.23 0.23 0.58 -0.01 1.00           
(31)  Both parties engage in joint R&D  0.05  -0.03 -0.05 0.07  -0.04 0.21  0.03  1.00         
(32)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  -0.06 -0.16 -0.04 -0.16 -0.11 0.23  -0.04 0.41  1.00       
(33)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.27 -0.06 -0.11 1.00     
(34)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  0.12 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.15 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.11  1.00  
(35)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.31 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.06 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
3 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 3: Whether Biotech Retains Co-Promotion Rights (Probit) 
  Dependent variable: Biotech retains co-promotion rights 
   
  Panel A: Characteristics of the biotech firms only 
    (1) (2) (3) 
0.018 -0.004 -0.031  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.020) 
0.825 0.733 0.926  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.270)***  (0.278)***  (0.339)*** 
-0.284 -0.390 -0.555  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.137)** (0.147)***  (0.461) 
-0.171 -0.084  0.008  (4)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log)  (0.100)*  (0.103)  (0.112) 
0.442 0.342 0.263  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.159)*** (0.172)**  (0.209) 
0.260 0.306 0.478  (6)  Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
(0.180) (0.204) (0.257)* 
0.175 0.185 0.166  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.046)*** (0.048)*** (0.066)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  565 533 515 
  Pseudo  R2  0.07 0.16 0.08 
        
  Panel B: Characteristics of the partner firm only 
    (4) (5) (6) 
0.074 0.023 0.038  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.027)***  (0.033)  (0.035) 
0.211 -0.091 -0.298  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.344)  (0.386)  (0.451) 
0.126 0.144 0.058  (10)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields  (log)  (0.081) (0.092) (0.096) 
0.018 -0.071  0.098  (11)  Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.190) (0.195) (0.208) 
0.079 0.103 0.072  (12) Partner's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.048) (0.052)**  (0.058) 
-0.264 -0.162 -0.329  (13)  Partner is biotech firm 
(0.200) (0.229) (0.260) 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  566 534 534 
  Pseudo  R2  0.16 0.27 0.14 
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings       Panel C: Other alliance terms only 
   (7)     
0.048    (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.025)*    
0.082    (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.036)**    
0.051    (16)  Milestone payments ($M)1,3 
(0.037)    
-0.474    (17) License  is  worldwide 
(0.216)**    
1.359    (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.199)***     
0.193    (19)  Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration 
(0.143)    
-0.104    (20)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials 
(0.147)    
0.329    (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.160)**    
-0.160    (22)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech 
(0.277)    
-0.266    (23)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by 
partner (0.199)     
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N    
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N    
 Observations  566     
 Pseudo  R2  0.27     
   
  Panel D: Full regression (only selected regressors shown) 
   (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.010 -0.023 -0.059  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field as the alliance  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.028)** 
0.633 0.669 1.151  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.321)**  (0.351)*  (0.475)** 
-0.477 -0.457 -1.145  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.167)*** (0.167)*** (0.542)** 
0.543 0.555 0.487  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.181)*** (0.199)*** (0.249)* 
0.114 0.112 0.135  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.054)** (0.057)** (0.072)* 
0.034 0.023 0.065  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.043) 
-0.270 -0.051  0.123  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.433)  (0.462)  (0.627) 
0.040 0.046 0.071  (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.034)** 
0.079 0.081 0.094  (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.039)** (0.040)** (0.056)* 
1.364 1.456 1.816  (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.213)***  (0.246)***  (0.319)*** 
0.293 0.293 0.529  (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.157)* (0.164)* (0.210)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
 Observations  565  533  515  Pseudo  R2  0.34  0.37  0.48 
Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%  
 show that the biotech firm’s financial position is strongly correlated with retaining co-promotion 
rights. This consistent with the prediction by Aghion & Tirole (1994) and the empirical finding 
by Lerner & Merges (1998). However, set alongside the evidence on the more strategic reasons 
for retaining co-promotion rights presented above, it suggests that the decision whether to enter 
into a co-promotion arrangement or a pure licensing agreement involves a trade-off between the 
technology firm’s need for immediate cash and the value of acquiring the knowledge that will 
enable it to commercialize future innovations alone. 
The negative relationship between retaining co-promotion rights and the biotech firm’s age, 
which is highly significant in line 3 of the full regression presented in Panel D, is consistent with 
the dynamic story told above. In its earlier years, a biotech firm chooses between entering into 
co-promotion arrangements (to the extent it can afford to) in order to build commercialization 
capabilities in its primary product area(s), and licensing out products outside those areas. 
However, once it has integrated downstream into commercialization process in particular product 
areas, its choice is between commercializing alone in its primary product area(s) and licensing. 
Since it is possible to observe only licensing and co-promotion (but not commercializing alone) 
in the data, we are more likely to observe licensing than co-promotion at later years in the firm’s 
life. 
The positive relationship between retaining co-promotion rights and the “upfront” financial 
terms
23 is on the face surprising since the model predicts that there should be a trade-off between 
financial and non-financial terms. However, a possible explanation is that there is an omitted 
variable at the same time reflects the biotech firm’s bargaining power and also drives the ability 
to negotiate both higher financial payments and stronger non-financial terms.  
The positive relationship between co-promotion rights and co-development rights (reflected in 
line 18) likely reflects the complementarities between clinical development and marketing. If a 
firm becomes involved in the commercialization of a particular alliance product, there are 
                                                 
23 Equity payments are, in effect, upfront payments since they are usually paid in cash at the time of the alliance, 
albeit in exchange for equity. efficiencies to being involved in both the development and marketing of that product. Moreover, 
a firm which seeks to integrate downstream into marketing is likely to want the capability to 
perform the clinical development of its future products, and hence for similar reasons may retain 
co-development rights in an alliance in order to be able to develop its expertise in that activity. 
Meanwhile, there are also likely to be efficiencies created by being involved in R&D related to 
clinical development, which may explain the significant relationship in line 21 of Table 1: 
Descriptive statistics 
  N mean s.d.  min  max 
Characteristics of biotech firm          
Years since founding (years)  565  10.51  6.41  1  36 
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  19.26  20.13  0  142 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  414  822  2,999  0.18  41,909 
Number of assigned patents (for alliances prior to 12/2002)  351  17.23  47.70  0  463.00 
          
Characteristics of partner          
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  52.13  56.85  0  257 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.56  0.50  0  1 
Biotech firm (d)  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Valuation ($M)1,2,3  321  55,394 58,865  35.49  330,854 
          
Basic characteristics of the alliance          
Year alliance signed  565  1999.3 4.20  1992  2006 
Alliance filed with SEC (d)  565  0.91  0.29  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance: 
Discovery 565  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Lead molecule  565  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Preclinical 565  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Phase I  565  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Phase II  565  0.09  0.28  0  1 
Phase III  565  0.06  0.24  0  1 
BLA/NDA filed  565  0.01  0.11  0  1 
Approved for sale  565  0.03  0.18  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance:  460  2.66  2.04  1  8 
          
Relationship between alliance and firms' prior experience 
Count of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  2.94  4.61  0  28 
Proportion of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  0.20  0.28  0  1 
Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  1.84  2.60  0  19 
Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  0.13  0.22  0  1 
          
Alliance terms          
Financial terms          
Upfront payments ($M)1,3  400  9,942  21,754  0  226,405 
Equity payments ($M)1,3  304  13,072 67,909  0  1,141,079
Milestone payments ($M)1,3  352  74,626 140,202  0  905,618 
Royalty rate (max.)4  211  15.7  17.1  0  80.0 
Non-financial terms          
License is worldwide  565  0.85  0.36  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to co-promote the alliance product  565  0.21  0.40  0  1 Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical development  565  0.17  0.37  0  1 
Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  565  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  565  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  565  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner  565  0.18  0.39  0  1 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
4 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 2: Correlation matrix 
  Panel A                          
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
(1) Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance 
product (d) 
1 . 0 0                        
(2)  Biotech markets product in alliance disease field 
within 5 years (d) 
0.10 1.00                       
(3)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance (d) 
0.47 0.09 1.00                      
(4)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance in same disease field (d) 
0.67 0.16 0.71 1.00                     
(5) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee 
0.18 0.10 0.23 0.21 1.00                    
(6) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee in same disease field 
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.64 1.00                   
(7)  Years  since  founding  (log)  -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.07 1.00                  
(8)  Count of biotech's prior alliances -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.28 0.17 0.47 1.00                 
(9)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field 
0.18 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.28 1.00                
(10)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field 
0.19 0.15 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.08 -0.10 -0.18 0.59 1.00               
(11)  Count of biotech's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field2 
0.09 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.69 0.55 1.00              
(12) Proportion  of  biotech's  concurrent alliances in 
same disease field2 
0.14 0.15 0.03 0.18 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.15 0.47 0.75 0.63 1.00              
(13) Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.14 0.02 0.52 0.38 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.40 0.24 -0.06 0.07 -0.04  1.00            
(14) Biotech is publicly listed (d)  0.09 0.09 0.16 0.12 -0.05 -0.06 0.35 0.26 0.21 -0.02 0.04 -0.01  0.23 1.00                    
(15)  Biotech's  valuation  (log)1  0.01 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.34 0.15 0.21 0.40 0.01 -0.09 -0.03  -0.09  0.19 -0.03 1.00          
(16)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log) 
0.23 -0.03 0.17 0.21 0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.03  0.11 0.10 -0.01 1.00         
(17)  Count of partner's prior alliances in same disease 
field as alliance (log) 
0.21 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.09  0.14 0.08 0.07 0.53 1.00        
(18)  Proportion of partner's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance 
0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.07  0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.17 0.37 1.00       
(19)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance2 
0.22 0.03 0.18 0.26 0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.36 0.73 0.35 1.00          
(20) Proportion  of  partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance2 
0.00 0.12 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.18 0.28 0.76 0.38 1.00        
(21) Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.19 0.03 0.20 0.19 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.13 -0.08 0.57 0.31 -0.16 0.30 -0.19 1.00    
(22) Partner is a biotech firm  -0.16 -0.04 -0.14 -0.15 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.14 -0.03 -0.17 -0.03 -0.17  0.00 -0.09 0.13 -0.35 -0.05 0.18 -0.06 0.24 -0.59 1.00   
(23) Partner's valuation (log)1  0.14 -0.06 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.02  0.07 0.13 0.03 0.58 0.10 -0.29 0.08 -0.29 0.49 -0.53 1.00  
(24) Biotech equity-market index  0.14 -0.07 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.39 0.36 0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12  0.15 0.15 0.19 0.45 0.33 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.27 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 includes alliances signed in two years prior to or year following the subject alliance                 
  Panel B                
    (1)  (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33)  (34) (35)
(1)  Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance  product  (d) 1.00               
(25)  Upfront  payments  ($000)1,2  0.30  1.00              
(26)  Equity  payments  ($000)1,2  0.17  0.74  1.00             
(27)  Milestone  payments  ($000)1,2  0.41 0.57 0.50 1.00                 
(28)  Royalty  rate2  0.34 0.20 0.13 0.12 1.00               
(29)  License is worldwide  -0.12 -0.18 -0.13 -0.06 -0.32 1.00             
(30)  Biotech has right to co-develop the alliance product (d)  0.43  0.37  0.23 0.23 0.58 -0.01 1.00           
(31)  Both parties engage in joint R&D  0.05  -0.03 -0.05 0.07  -0.04 0.21  0.03  1.00         
(32)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  -0.06 -0.16 -0.04 -0.16 -0.11 0.23  -0.04 0.41  1.00       
(33)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.27 -0.06 -0.11 1.00     
(34)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  0.12 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.15 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.11  1.00  
(35)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.31 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.06 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
3 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance Table 3: Whether Biotech Retains Co-Promotion Rights (Probit) 
  Dependent variable: Biotech retains co-promotion rights 
   
  Panel A: Characteristics of the biotech firms only 
    (1) (2) (3) 
0.018 -0.004 -0.031  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.020) 
0.825 0.733 0.926  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.270)***  (0.278)***  (0.339)*** 
-0.284 -0.390 -0.555  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.137)** (0.147)***  (0.461) 
-0.171 -0.084  0.008  (4)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log)  (0.100)*  (0.103)  (0.112) 
0.442 0.342 0.263  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.159)*** (0.172)**  (0.209) 
0.260 0.306 0.478  (6)  Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
(0.180) (0.204) (0.257)* 
0.175 0.185 0.166  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.046)*** (0.048)*** (0.066)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  565 533 515 
  Pseudo  R2  0.07 0.16 0.08 
        
  Panel B: Characteristics of the partner firm only 
    (4) (5) (6) 
0.074 0.023 0.038  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.027)***  (0.033)  (0.035) 
0.211 -0.091 -0.298  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.344)  (0.386)  (0.451) 
0.126 0.144 0.058  (10)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields  (log)  (0.081) (0.092) (0.096) 
0.018 -0.071  0.098  (11)  Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.190) (0.195) (0.208) 
0.079 0.103 0.072  (12) Partner's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.048) (0.052)**  (0.058) 
-0.264 -0.162 -0.329  (13)  Partner is biotech firm 
(0.200) (0.229) (0.260) 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
  Observations  566 534 534 
  Pseudo  R2  0.16 0.27 0.14 
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings       Panel C: Other alliance terms only 
   (7)     
0.048    (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.025)*    
0.082    (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.036)**    
0.051    (16)  Milestone payments ($M)1,3 
(0.037)    
-0.474    (17) License  is  worldwide 
(0.216)**    
1.359    (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.199)***     
0.193    (19)  Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration 
(0.143)    
-0.104    (20)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials 
(0.147)    
0.329    (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.160)**    
-0.160    (22)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech 
(0.277)    
-0.266    (23)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by 
partner (0.199)     
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N    
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N    
 Observations  566     
 Pseudo  R2  0.27     
   
  Panel D: Full regression (only selected regressors shown) 
   (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.010 -0.023 -0.059  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field as the alliance  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.028)** 
0.633 0.669 1.151  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.321)**  (0.351)*  (0.475)** 
-0.477 -0.457 -1.145  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.167)*** (0.167)*** (0.542)** 
0.543 0.555 0.487  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.181)*** (0.199)*** (0.249)* 
0.114 0.112 0.135  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)1,2 
(0.054)** (0.057)** (0.072)* 
0.034 0.023 0.065  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.043) 
-0.270 -0.051  0.123  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.433)  (0.462)  (0.627) 
0.040 0.046 0.071  (14)  Upfront payments ($M)1,3 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.034)** 
0.079 0.081 0.094  (15)  Equity payments ($M)1,3 
(0.039)** (0.040)** (0.056)* 
1.364 1.456 1.816  (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.213)***  (0.246)***  (0.319)*** 
0.293 0.293 0.529  (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.157)* (0.164)* (0.210)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N N Y 
 Observations  565  533  515  Pseudo  R2  0.34  0.37  0.48 
Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 




This paper presents a framework for a technology firm to think about its commercialization 
strategy in the context where it expects to generate successive innovations in the same product 
area but the established product firms are much better positioned with respect to the 
complementary assets required to commercialize that innovation. While Teece (1986) argued 
that an innovating firm’s optimal strategy is to contract with an established firm to 
commercialize its innovation, if it does this for successive innovations then it is unlikely to make 
superior profits over the long term. At the same time, because commercializing alone involves 
substantially higher risks, integrating downstream from the start is unlikely to be more profitable. 
Nevertheless, this paper shows that, under certain conditions, following a hybrid strategy – in 
which the technology firm contracts with an established product firm but retains the rights to 
participate in the commercialization process – may enable the technology firm to capture the 
greater share of the profits from its innovation over the long term. The technology firm prefers 
this arrangement because it reduces the risk of failure in the short-term, enabling it to bring its 
latest innovation to market in a timely and cost-effective manner. At the same time this 
arrangement enables it to acquire the knowledge necessary to commercialize future innovations 
alone over the long term. At the same time, the established product firm agrees to this 
arrangement, even though it potentially creates a competitor, if it can share that cost with other 
product firms. Whether the firms opt for this hybrid option depends not only on the firm’s 
financial strength, but also on the relationship between its underlying capabilities and the product 
field in which the innovation will be commercialized. 
The paper has some pertinent implications for managers. While it may be necessary for a 
technology firm to partner with an established firm when it first enters an industry, in negotiating 
such an alliance managers must also consider how the firm can achieve superior profitability 
over the long term. If the firm expects to generate future innovations in the same product field, it 
is important to loosen the control that the established firms over the complementary assets 2 
necessary to commercialize an innovation. One way to do this is to use its leverage in alliance 
negotiations to acquire the knowledge necessary to build its own commercialization capabilities. 
Specifically, it can negotiate to the rights to participate in the commercialization process, and 
thereby learn directly from its alliance partner.  
However, acquiring commercialization capabilities will only be a worthwhile strategy if the firm 
generates successive innovations in the same product field. Building those capabilities requires a 
substantial investment, which will only give a return over the longer term. At the same time, 
retaining rights to participate in the commercialization process is likely to involve giving up 
greater financial payments. While maintaining control over the commercialization process and 
acquiring its own capabilities may give the firm access to a greater revenue stream in the long 
term, negotiating greater financial payments increases the firm’s cash flow and helps it to meet 
short-term obligations. If it is financially weak, it may have to give up control until it has 
strengthened its position. If the innovation is outside the firm’s core focus then it is likely to be 
better off licensing the innovation and remaining out of the product field. 3 
APPENDIX 
Workings of the model 
Benchmark case: No experiential learning 
I first calculate T’s expected profits and determine the optimal strategies in the case where T does 
not learn from experience – that is, its probability of successfully commercializing an innovation 
does not rise from  0 σ  even if it is successful. The profits under this benchmark case also mirror 
the profits that T will earn if innovates outside the current product field. 
Under this benchmark case, co-promotion is equivalent to licensing because T’s probability of 
successfully commercializing an innovation does not change even if it participates in a 
successful commercialization. Hence I consider only two strategies: ‘licensing’ (L), in which the 
product firm obtains exclusive rights to commercialize the innovation, and ‘not licensing’ (NL).  
Expected profits calculated at start of each subgame 
To begin with I calculate the expected profits at the start of a given subgame – that is, before T 
has innovated in the product field. Since the relative merits of licensing versus not licensing do 
not change across periods, T’s choice of strategy is consistent over time.  
Let 
L
T Π  and 
NL
T Π  denote T’s  present discounted profits under licensing and not licensing 
calculated at the start of each subgame. Let  [0,1] δ ∈  be the discount factor. The values of  
L
T Π  
and 
NL
T Π  are given by the following expressions: 
11 11 [( 1 ) ] ( 1 ) [( 1 ) ]
1
L
LL L L L L
T T
X
XX XX φσ σ φ σ σ δ
δ









φσπ σ δ φ σπ σ δ
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Pi Π be Pi’s expected present discounted profits when T licenses and Pi is the licensee and 
L
P i − Π  be the same when Pi is not the licensee (respectively). Let λ be the probability that Pi earns 4 
0 π , given that Pi has successfully commercialized its own innovation and T’s innovation has not 
been commercialized. The values of these variables are described by the following expressions: 
*



































+ =− ∑  (5) 
Let 
NL














Expected profits calculated at the decision point 
The expressions above describe the expected profits at the start of each subgame. However, since 
the firms make the strategic decision occurs after T has innovated, it is necessary to calculate 
their profits at that point.  
Let 
L
T V  and 
NL
T V  be T’s present discounted profits under licensing and not licensing strategies at 
the point that it chooses whether or not to license the innovation. The values of these variables 
are given by the following expressions: 
LL L
T VX δ =+ Π  (7) 
01
NL NL
TT V σπ δ =+ Π  (8) 
Substituting the value of 











Substituting the values of 
NL









 (10) 5 
Let 
L
Pi V  and 
NL
Pi V  be Pi’s expected present discounted profits under licensing and not licensing 
strategies at the point the firms decide whether or not to license 
1 1
11 1 1 0 (1 ) ( )
LL L L N
PiP i P i NN VX σπ σ σλ π δ −
− =+ − − + Π + Π  (11) 
00 1 0 0 1 0 (0 ) (1 )[ ] (1 )
NL NL NL NL
PiP i P i P i V σδ σ σ λ π δ σ σ λ π δ =+ Π + − + Π = − + Π  (12) 
Substituting the value of 
L
Pi Π  from equation (3) and 
L










δφ σδ σ φ






Substituting the value of 
NL
Pi Π  from equation (6) into equation (12) gives 
00
10











Outcome of the negotiation game 
T chooses X











P P VX V ≥  (15) 
()
LL N L
TT VX V ≥  (16) 
According to condition (15), Pi will offer to license the innovation if after paying X
L Pi is at least 
as well off (over its time horizon) as it would be if it did not license. This implies that X
L* 
satisfies 














According to condition (16), T will accept the license if and only if the licensing fee X
L* leaves it 
at least as well off as if it were not to license. That is, T will offer to license if 
01
L X σ π ≥  (18) 6 












, it will set 
X
L* at the maximum Pi is willing to pay. Therefore, if T accepts the license, it will demand a fee 
X
L* such that  
*














Under this scenario licensing will occur in equilibrium if: 
10 1 1 0 1
1( 1)
() [ ] 0
1( 1 ) N
δ φ






Since  10 σ σ > , 10 π π > , and  1 N ≥  by definition, this condition is always satisfied and T will 
always license the innovation in equilibrium. Assuming T has the power to set the licensing 
fee,
24 T will set X
L* at the maximum Pi is willing to pay.
25 Therefore, it will demand a fee X
L* 
such that  
*














Licensing vs Not Licensing with Experiential Learning 
Now I allow for the possibility of experiential learning if T successfully commercializes the 
innovation alone. To begin with I consider the choice between only licensing and not licensing.  
                                                 
24 This assumption is unnecessary if N>1, since in an competitive negotiation process the firms P1, …, PN will 
bargain away their profits to induce T to enter the agreement. Moreover, in the case with only one product firm, 
although allowing P to have some (or all) of the bargaining power will change the payoffs, it will not change the 
equilibrium outcome(s). 











, T sets at the maximum Pi is willing to pay. 7 
Expected profits calculated at start of each subgame 
To calculate the expected profits, and hence determine which strategy the firms will choose, I 
distinguish between the expected profits for not licensing under two different scenarios: (1) 
before T has successfully commercialized an innovation alone; and (2) after T has successfully 
commercialized an innovation alone. I use NL as above to represent ‘not licensing’ before T has 
successfully commercialized an innovation alone and let NL' denote ‘not licensing’ after T has 
successfully commercialized an innovation alone. Let 
' NL
T Π  denote T’s present discounted profits 
under that scenario and let 
* L
T Π  and 
* NL
T Π  denote the present value of T’s expected profits if it 
innovates outside the particular product field. The values of 
L
T Π , 
NL
T Π  and 
' NL





















φσ π δφσ φ
δφ σ
















Since T’s probability of successfully commercializing an innovation outside this product field 
will not be affected by its prior commercialization activity in this product field,  T’s expected 
payoffs outside this particular product are equivalent to the payoffs in the case with no 
experiential learning. Moreover, as the analysis above shows, it is always optimal for T to license 
when there is no possibility of experiential learning, and hence T’s expected payoffs under 
licensing and not licensing (and correspondingly co-promotion) are described by the following 
expression: 
*** 11
10 1 0 1
1( 1)
()




σ π δ φ
σ σσ λ π
δδ δ φ
− −





T Π  from (25) into (22) gives 
11 1 0 1 0 1
11 ( 1 )
(1 )( )






σ πφ σ σ σ λ π
δφ δ δφ δ δφ δ φ
−− −
Π= + − − −
−− − − − − −
  (26) 8 
Substituting 
* NL
T Π  from  (25) into (24) gives 
' 11
10 1 0 1
(1 )[1 (1 )]
()




σ π φ δφ
σ σσ λ π
δδ δ φ δ φ
−− −
Π= − −




T Π  from (25) and  
' NL
T Π  from (27) into (23) gives 
00 1 1
11 0 1 0 1
0
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )[1 (1 )]
()




δ φσ δφσ σ φ σ φ δφ
π σσ σ λ π
δδ φ σ δδ φδ φ
−+ + − − −−
Π= − −




Pi Π be Pi’s expected present discounted profits when T licenses and Pi is the licensee and 
L
P i − Π   be the same when Pi is not the licensee (respectively). The values of these variables are 
described by the following expressions: 
























Pi Π be Pi’s expected present discounted profits when T does not license before T acquires 
commercialization capabilities and 
' NL
Pi V  be the same after T acquires those capabilities. The 
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NL
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 (33) 9 
Expected profits calculated at the decision point 
Let 
L
T V  and 
NL
T V  be T’s present discounted profits under licensing and not licensing strategies at 
the point that it chooses whether or not to license the innovation. The values of these variables 
are given by the following expressions: 
LL LL L
TT T VX X δ δ =+ Π =+ Π  (34) 
''
01 0 01 0 () ( 1 ) ( 0 ) () ( 1 )
NL NL NL NL NL
TT T TT V σπ δ σ δ σπ δ δ σ =+ Π + − ⋅ + Π =+ Π + − Π  (35) 
Substituting the value of 
L
T Π  from equation (26) into equation (34) gives 
11 1 0 1 0 1
(1 ) [1 (1 )]
(1 )( )








σ πφ σ σ σ λ π
δφ δ δφ δ δφ δ φ
−− −
=+ − − −
−− − − − − −
(36) 
Substituting the values of 
' NL
T Π  from equation (27) and 
NL




11 0 1 0 1
0
[1 (1 )] (1 ) (1 )[1 (1 )]
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π σσ σ λ π
δδ φ σ δδ φδ φ
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Pi V  and 
NL
Pi V  be Pi’s expected present discounted profits under licensing and not licensing 
strategies at the point the firms decide whether or not to license 
1
11 1 1 0 1 (1 ) ( )
LL L L N
PiP i P i NN VX σπ σ σλ π δ − − =+ − − + Π + Π  (38) 
'
00 1 0 (0 ) (1 )[ ]
NL NL NL
PiP i P i V σδ σ σ λ π δ =+ Π + − + Π  (39) 
Substituting the values of 
L
Pi Π  from equation (29) and 
L
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Substituting the values of 
NL
Pi Π  from equation (33) and 
' NL
Pi Π  from equation (32) into equation 




(1 )(1 ) (1 )[1 (1 )]
(1 )[1 (1 )]
NL
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Outcome of the negotiation game 
T chooses X











P P VX V ≥  (42) 
()
LL N L
TT VX V ≥  (43) 
According to condition (42), Pi will offer to license the innovation if after paying X
L it is at least 
as well off (over its time horizon) as it would be if it did not license. This implies that X
L satisfies 
11 1 0 1 0 1
0
11 ( 1 )
()





σ πσ σ σ λ π





According to condition (43), T will accept the license if and only if the licensing fee X
L leaves it 














Licensing will occur in equilibrium if the maximum fee which P is willing to pay – that is, the X
L 
which satisfies (44) – is higher than the minimum fee that T is willing to accept – that is, the X
L 
that satisfies (45). That is: 
11 0 1
11 ( 1 )
0








Since T has the power to set the fee, if condition (46) is satisfied, it will demand a fee X
L* such 
that   
11 1 0 1 0 1
0
11 ( 1 )
()





σ πσ σ σ λ π




 (47) 11 
Licensing vs Co-promotion with Experiential Learning 
Now consider the situation where co-promotion is an option. Since I am interested in the 
decision between licensing and co-promotion, I assume that condition (46) is satisfied – that is, 
that T will always prefer to license the innovation to Pi rather than commercialize it alone in 
equilibrium.  
Expected profits calculated at start of each subgame 
Let 
CP
T Π  denote the present value of T’s expected profits from a co-promotion arrangement 
before it has commercialized an innovation successfully. Once T has successfully 
commercialized an innovation as part a co-promotion arrangement, it obtains the 
commercialization capabilities equivalent to an established product firm and hence will choose to 
commercialize future innovations all alone. Hence in that case T’s expected profits in that case 
are given by 
' NL









X φδ φ σ φ
δφ σ






T Π  from (25) and 
' NL
T Π  from equation (27) into equation (48) gives 
1
11 1 0 1 0 1
11
1( 1 ) (1 )[1 (1 )]
()





φ δσ φ φδ φ
σ πσ σ σ λ π
δφ σ δ δφ σ δ δ φ
−− − −−
Π= + − −
−− −−− −− −
  (49) 
Let 
CP
Pi Π  be present value of Pi’s expected profits when Pi is the co-promotion partner (before T 
has commercialized an innovation successfully) and 
CP
P i − Π be the same when it is not. As above, 
Pi’s expected profits after T has commercialized an innovation successfully are given by 
' NL
Pi Π . 
The values of 
CP
Pi Π  and 
CP
P i − Π  are given by the following expressions 
'
11 1 1 1 0
1





X φ σπ δ σ φ σ σλ π
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 (51) 12 
Substituting 
' NL
































Expected profits calculated at the decision point 
As for the two-strategy case, it is necessary to calculate the firms’ profits from the point at which 
they make the strategic choice. Let 
CP
T V  and 
CP
Pi V be  T’s and Pi’s (respectively) present 
discounted profits under the co-promotion strategy. The values of these variables are given by 
the following expressions: 
'
11 () ( 1 ) ()
CP CP NL CP CP
TT T VX X σδ σ δ =+ Π + − + Π  (54) 
' 1 1
11 1 1 0 () ( 1 ) [( ) ]
CP NL CP CP CP N
Pi Pi Pi P i NN VX σπ δ σ σ λ π δ −
− =+ Π + − + Π + Π −  (55) 
Substituting 
' NL
T Π  from equation (27) and 
CP
T Π  from equation (49) into equation (54) gives 
1
11 1 0 1 0 1
11
[1 (1 )] 1 (1 )[1 (1 )]
()





δ φσ δ φδ φ
σ πσ σ σ λ π
δφ σ δ δφ σ δ δφ δ φ
−− − −−
=+ − −
−− −−− −− − −
  (56) 
Substituting 
' NL
Pi Π  from equation (32) and 
CP
Pi Π  from equation (52) and 
CP
Pi Π  from equation (53) 
into equation (55) gives 
1
1 1
11 1 1 0
1
(1 ) (1 )
[1 ]( ) [(1 ) ]
1( 1 ) 1
CP CP N
Pi VX
δφ σ δφ σ
σ πσσ λ π
δφ σ δ
− −
=+ − + − +
−− −
 (57) 
Outcome of the negotiation game 
T will choose X








CP CP L L
Pi Pi VX V X ≥  (58) 
()
CP CP NL
PiP i VX V ≥  (59) 
() ( )
CP CP L L
TT VX V X ≥  (60) 
()
CP CP NL
TT VX V ≥  (61) 
Since I assume that T always prefers licensing to not licensing (i.e., condition (46) is satisfied), T 
sets  X
L* at the point where Pi is indifferent between licensing and not licensing (i.e., 
* ()
LL N L
PiP i VX V = ). Hence, I can combine and rewrite conditions (58) and (59) as 
** ()( )
CP CP L L
PP VX V X ≥  (62) 














σ σσ λ π
δφδ φ σ δ φ σ δφ −
−−
≤− −
−− + −− −−
 (63) 
This can also be written in terms of X
L*: 
* 1
11 1 0 1 0 1 1
10
[1 (1 )][1 (1 )]
()





δ φδ φ σ
σ πσ σ σ λ π





From condition (64) it follows that the maximum fee that Pi is willing to pay under a co-
promotion arrangement (X
CP*) is lower than maximum fee it is willing to pay under a pure 
licensing arrangement (X
L*). The
 intuition behind this is that after T acquires the capabilities to 
commercialize alone through the co-promotion arrangement, it no longer has to compensate Pi in 
each period. However, since co-promoting with T increases the probability of T becoming a 
potential competitor and hence reduces the expected profits Pi will earn on its own innovation, Pi 
demands that it be compensated upfront for this future loss in profits.
26 How much compensation 
                                                 
26 Note that, given T has the power to set the fee at the maximum level Pi is willing to pay, T captures all the profits 
from its innovation, regardless of whether Pi commercializes it or T commercializes it alone. Hence, Pi is not any 
worse off under co-promotion due to no longer having the opportunity to commercialize T’s future innovations. 
Moreover because the probability of T’s innovation being commercialized does not change whether T licenses to Pi, 
co-promotes with Pi, or commercializes alone once it has acquired the capabilities, Pi’s expected returns from its 
outside option are not any different under licensing or co-promotion. Hence the full amount of the difference 
between XCP and XL is due to the capitalized value of Pi expected future losses from T obtaining 
commercialization capabilities. 14 
Pi demands depends on how many other firms share the cost of T becoming a competitor (i.e., on 
N). 
Since T (weakly) prefers licensing to non-licensing (i.e., 
* ()
LL N L
TT VX V ≥ ), conditions (60) and 
(61) can be combined and rewritten as 
** ()( )
CP CP L L
TT VX V X ≥  (65) 
According to condition (65), T will agree to co-promote if 
1
10 1 0 1
0
(1 )[1 (1 )]
()




δφσ δ δ φ
σ σσ λ π





Rewriting this in terms of X
L* leads to the following expression:   
1
11 1 0 1 0 1
0
1( 1) 11 ( 1 )
()





σ πσ σ σ λ π
δφ δ φσ δ φ
−− −− −
≥− −
−− − − −
 (67) 
From condition (67) it follows that the minimum fee T is willing to accept under a co-promotion 
arrangement is lower than the minimum fee under pure licensing. The intuition is that because 
there is a positive probability that under the co-promotion arrangement T will acquire the 
capability to commercialize alone in future and hence will not have to compensate Pi in future 
periods for the additional threat to its outside option.
27 
Co-promotion will occur in equilibrium if the maximum fee that Pi is willing to pay is higher 
than the minimum fee T is willing to accept  
1
11 1 0 1 0 1 1
10
1
11 1 0 1 0 1
0
[1 (1 )][1 (1 )]
()
[1 (1 ) ][1 (1 )]
1( 1) 11 ( 1 )
()




δ φδ φ σ
σπ σ σ σλ π
δφδ φ σ δ φ σ
δφ σ δδ φ
σ πσ σ σ λ π







−− − − −
 
This inequality simplifies to 
                                                 
27 Note since T already captures all the profits from the superiority of its innovation over P’s outside option, it does 





(1 )[1 (1 )][1 (1 ) ] (1 )[1 (1 )][1 (1 )]
0





δδ φ σ δ φ δ φ σ δ φδ φ δ φ σ
δ φ δφ δφδ φ σ
−
−
−−− − −+ − − − − − −
≥
−− − − − +
  (68) 
Moreover, it holds if and only if 
1 11
11 1 (1 )[1 (1 )][1 (1 ) ] (1 )[1 (1 )][1 (1 )] 0 N
NN N δ δφ σ δ φ δφσ δφ δ φ δ φσ − − − − −− + − − −− −− ≥
  (69) 
If condition (69) is satisfied, T will set X
CP* such that 
1
11 1 0 1 0 1
0
1( 1) 11 ( 1 )
()





σ πσ σ σ λ π
δφ δ φσ δ φ
−− −− −
=− −
−− − − −
 (70) 
Proofs 
Lemma 1: (a) In a technology commercialization game with no experiential learning, the unique 
equilibrium outcome is where T licenses the innovation to an established product firm Pi. 
(b) In a technology commercialization game with experiential learning, not licensing will be an 
equilibrium outcome if the number of firms (N) and the probability of T commercializing a 
future innovation in the particular product field (φ) are sufficiently large. 
Proof: (a) This proposition follows because, since  10 π π >  and  1 N ≥  by definition, condition 
(20) is always satisfied if  10 σ σ >  – that is, as long Pi is better positioned with respect to the 
complementary assets.  
(b) According to condition (46), licensing will occur in equilibrium if 
11 0 1
11 ( 1 )
0








Hence, obversely, firms will not license in equilibrium if 
10 1 1
11 ( 1 )








This can be rewritten as  
1
10 1 (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) 0 N δ δδ φ σ λ π δ φ δ δ φ π −− + − − − + ≥  (73) 16 
Hence, the probability that T and Pi will not license in equilibrium (i.e., Pr( ) NL L f ) is: 
1
10 1 Pr( ) Pr[(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) 0] N NL L δ δδ φ σ λ π δ φ δ δ φ π = − −+ −− −+ ≥ f  (74) 
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δ δλ π δ δ δ φπ
φ
− ∂




The value of 





 is positive universally, while the value of 





 is positive if 
N and/or φ are sufficiently large. This means that the probability of not licensing is everywhere 
increasing in N and increasing in φ  f o r  N and φ  sufficiently large. Hence will prefer not 
licensing to licensing for some (sufficiently large) values of N and φ. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2: (a) Co-promotion will be an equilibrium outcome of the technology 
commercialization game with experiential learning only if  2 N ≥ .  
(b) The likelihood that T and Pi will choose to co-promote rather than license the innovation is 
increasing in the number of established product firms with which T could potentially contract to 
commercialize the innovation. 
Proof: (a) T and Pi will (strictly) prefer to co-promote rather than license the innovation if and 
only if condition (69) is satisfied (as an inequality). This condition can be simplified to 
1 1
1 (1 )(1 ) (1 )[1 (1 ) 0 N
NN δ δφ δφσ δ φ δ φ − −− + − −− −>  (77) 
Hence, the probability that T and Pi will prefer to co-promote (i.e., Pr( ) CP L f ) rather than 
license is: 
1 1
1 Pr( ) Pr{ (1 )[1 (1 )] (1 )[1 (1 )] 0} N
NN CP L δ δφ σ δ φ δ φ − =− − − − − − − > f  (78) 17 
If N=1, it is straightforward to show that Pr( ) 0 CP L = f  in all cases and hence T and Pi will 
never agree to co-promote.  
(b) The effect of a change in N on Pr( ) CP L f  is given by 
2
1 22
Pr( ) 1 1
(1 )[1 (1 )] (1 )
dC P L
dN N N
δδ φ σ δ φ φ =− − − + −
f
 (79) 
Since  0< 1 δ < ,  01 φ <≤ , and  1 01 σ ≤≤  by definition, this expression is always positive and 
hence the probability that T and Pi agree to co-promote rather than license is always increasing in 
N. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 3: The likelihood that T and Pi will choose to co-promote rather than license the 
innovation is increasing in T’s financial position. 
Proof: If condition (69) is satisfied then, in accordance with condition (70), T will co-promote in 
exchange for a payment 
1
11 1 0 1 0 1
0
1( 1) 11 ( 1 )
()





σ πσ σ σ λ π
δφ δ φσ δ φ
−− −− −
=− −
−− − − −
   (80) 
The value of X




10 1 0 1
0
(1 )[1 (1 )]
()
[1 (1 )](1 )[1 (1 )] N
δφσ δ δ φ
σ σσ λ π




 (as per 
proposition(66)), and it is possible that this value may in fact be negative. It may still be optimal 
for T to enter such an arrangement, even if X
CP* is negative, because T expects to recoup the 
payment through greater profits in future periods.
28 It may fund the payment from other revenues 
or through raising additional finance. However, this assumes that T is in a sufficient financial 
position to be able to do so. If instead it is financially constrained, so it does not have other 
revenues and cannot raise the cash to make the payment, it will be forced to forego co-promotion 
and opt for pure licensing. Q.E.D. 
                                                 
28 Note that this is not the case under licensing. However, the maximum XL* that Pi is willing to accept according 
to condition (44) is always positive, so this issue does not arise with straight licensing. 18 
Proposition 1: The likelihood that T and Pi will attempt to co-promote the innovation (rather T 
merely license the innovation to Pi) is increasing in the probability that T will innovate in the 
particular product field in future (φ) if the number of firms (N) and/or the probability of an 
established product firm successfully commercializing an innovation ( 1 σ ) are sufficiently large. 
Proof: Following the reasoning in the proof of Lemma 2, the effect of a change in φ  on 








δ δδ φ σδ
φ
− =− + + −
f
 (81) 
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2[ 1 2 2 ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ]







δ δφ σ δ
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− −+ + − ≥
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≥−  (82) 
Hence the probability of the firm’s choosing co-promotion over pure licensing is increasing in 
T’s expertise in the product field of the alliance if  1
2 φ ≥  or, more generally, if 
1 1
2






≥− .  Hence the likelihood that T and Pi will choose to co-promote the 
innovation (rather T merely license the innovation to Pi) is increasing in φ if N and  1 σ  are 
sufficiently large. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2: The likelihood that T and Pi will choose to co-promote (as opposed to license) the 
innovation is increasing in the probability that an established product firm will successfully 
commercializing the innovation ( 1 σ ). 
Proof: Following the same reasoning as above, the effect of a change in Pi’s expertise ( 1 σ ) on 
the probability of the parties choosing co-promotion over pure licensing is described by the 
following expression 19 
1
1







− =−  (83) 
Since 0 φ >  and 0< 1 δ < , this expression is always positive. Hence the probability of the firm’s 
choosing co-promotion over pure licensing is increasing in the probability that Pi will 
successfully commercialize the innovation. Q.E.D. 
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Figure 1: Biotech-to-pharma alliances with and without co-promotion rights 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  N mean s.d.  min  max 
Characteristics of biotech firm          
Years since founding (years)  565  10.51  6.41  1  36 
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  19.26  20.13  0  142 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Valuation ($M)
1,2,3 414  822  2,999  0.18  41,909 
Number of assigned patents (for alliances prior to 12/2002)  351  17.23  47.70  0  463.00 
          
Characteristics of partner          
Count of prior alliances in all disease fields  565  52.13  56.85  0  257 
Has prior co-promotion deal (d)  565  0.56  0.50  0  1 
Biotech firm (d)  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Valuation ($M)
1,2,3 321  55,394 58,865  35.49  330,854 
          
Basic characteristics of the alliance          
Year alliance signed  565  1999.3 4.20  1992  2006 
Alliance filed with SEC (d)  565  0.91  0.29  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance: 
Discovery 565  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Lead molecule  565  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Preclinical 565  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Phase I  565  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Phase II  565  0.09  0.28  0  1 
Phase III  565  0.06  0.24  0  1 
BLA/NDA filed  565  0.01  0.11  0  1 
Approved for sale  565  0.03  0.18  0  1 
Stage of product commercialization at time of alliance:  460  2.66  2.04  1  8 
          
Relationship between alliance and firms' prior experience 
Count of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  2.94  4.61  0  28 
Proportion of biotech firm's prior alliances in same disease field  565  0.20  0.28  0  1 
Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  1.84  2.60  0  19 
Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in same disease field  565  0.13  0.22  0  1 
          
Alliance terms          
Financial terms          
Upfront payments ($M)
1,3 400  9,942  21,754  0  226,405 
Equity payments ($M)
1,3  304  13,072 67,909 0 1,141,079
Milestone payments ($M)
1,3 352  74,626 140,202  0  905,618 
Royalty rate (max.)
4 211  15.7  17.1  0  80.0 
Non-financial terms          
License is worldwide  565  0.85  0.36  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to co-promote the alliance product  565  0.21  0.40  0  1 
Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical development  565  0.17  0.37  0  1 
Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration  565  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  565  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  565  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  565  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner  565  0.18  0.39  0  1 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
4 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance 25 
Table 2: Correlation matrix 
  Panel A                          
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
(1) Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance 
product (d) 
1 . 0 0                        
(2)  Biotech markets product in alliance disease field 
within 5 years (d) 
0.10 1.00                       
(3)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance (d) 
0.47 0.09 1.00                      
(4)  Biotech retains co-promotion right in subs. 
alliance in same disease field (d) 
0.67 0.16 0.71 1.00                     
(5) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee 
0.18 0.10 0.23 0.21 1.00                    
(6) Proportion of subs. alliances where biotech is 
licensee in same disease field 
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.64 1.00                   
(7)  Years  since  founding  (log)  -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.07 1.00                  
(8)  Count of biotech's prior alliances -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.28 0.17 0.47 1.00                 
(9)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field 
0.18 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.28 1.00                
(10)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field 
0.19 0.15 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.08 -0.10 -0.18 0.59 1.00               
(11)  Count of biotech's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field
2 
0.09 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.69 0.55 1.00              
(12) Proportion  of  biotech's  concurrent alliances in 
same disease field
2 
0.14 0.15 0.03 0.18 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.15 0.47 0.75 0.63 1.00              
(13) Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.14 0.02 0.52 0.38 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.40 0.24 -0.06 0.07 -0.04  1.00            
(14) Biotech is publicly listed (d)  0.09 0.09 0.16 0.12 -0.05 -0.06 0.35 0.26 0.21 -0.02 0.04 -0.01  0.23 1.00                    
(15) Biotech's valuation (log)
1  0.01 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.34 0.15 0.21 0.40 0.01 -0.09 -0.03  -0.09  0.19 -0.03 1.00          
(16)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log) 
0.23 -0.03 0.17 0.21 0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.03  0.11 0.10 -0.01 1.00         
(17)  Count of partner's prior alliances in same disease 
field as alliance (log) 
0.21 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.09  0.14 0.08 0.07 0.53 1.00        
(18)  Proportion of partner's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance 
0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.07  0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.17 0.37 1.00       
(19)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance
2 
0.22 0.03 0.18 0.26 0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.36 0.73 0.35 1.00          
(20) Proportion  of  partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance
2 
0.00 0.12 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.18 0.28 0.76 0.38 1.00        
(21) Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d)  0.19 0.03 0.20 0.19 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.13 -0.08 0.57 0.31 -0.16 0.30 -0.19 1.00    
(22) Partner is a biotech firm  -0.16 -0.04 -0.14 -0.15 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.14 -0.03 -0.17 -0.03 -0.17  0.00 -0.09 0.13 -0.35 -0.05 0.18 -0.06 0.24 -0.59 1.00   
(23) Partner's valuation (log)
1 0.14 -0.06 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.02  0.07 0.13 0.03 0.58 0.10 -0.29 0.08 -0.29 0.49 -0.53 1.00  
(24) Biotech equity-market index  0.14 -0.07 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.39 0.36 0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12  0.15 0.15 0.19 0.45 0.33 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.27 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 includes alliances signed in two years prior to or year following the subject alliance 26 
                
  Panel B                
    (1)  (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33)  (34) (35)
(1)  Biotech has right to co-promote the alliance  product  (d) 1.00               
(25) Upfront  payments  ($000)
1,2  0.30  1.00              
(26) Equity  payments  ($000)
1,2  0.17  0.74  1.00             
(27)  Milestone payments ($000)
1,2  0.41 0.57 0.50 1.00                 
(28) Royalty  rate
2  0.34 0.20 0.13 0.12 1.00               
(29)  License is worldwide  -0.12 -0.18 -0.13 -0.06 -0.32 1.00             
(30)  Biotech has right to co-develop the alliance product (d)  0.43  0.37  0.23 0.23 0.58 -0.01 1.00           
(31)  Both parties engage in joint R&D  0.05  -0.03 -0.05 0.07  -0.04 0.21  0.03  1.00         
(32)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials  -0.06 -0.16 -0.04 -0.16 -0.11 0.23  -0.04 0.41  1.00       
(33)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials  0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.27 -0.06 -0.11 1.00     
(34)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech  0.12 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.15 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.11  1.00  
(35)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by partner 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.31 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.06 1.00
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings 
3 Recombinant Capital records highest rate listed on alliance 27 
Table 3: Whether Biotech Retains Co-Promotion Rights (Probit) 
  Dependent variable: Biotech retains co-promotion rights 
   
  Panel A: Characteristics of the biotech firms only 
    (1) (2) (3) 
0.018 -0.004 -0.031  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.020) 
0.825 0.733 0.926  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.270)***  (0.278)***  (0.339)*** 
-0.284 -0.390 -0.555  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.137)** (0.147)***  (0.461) 
-0.171 -0.084  0.008  (4)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all disease 
fields (log)  (0.100)*  (0.103)  (0.112) 
0.442 0.342 0.263  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.159)*** (0.172)**  (0.209) 
0.260 0.306 0.478  (6)  Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
(0.180) (0.204) (0.257)* 
0.175 0.185 0.166  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)
1,2 
(0.046)*** (0.048)*** (0.066)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N  N Y 
  Observations  565 533 515 
 Pseudo  R
2  0.07 0.16 0.08 
        
  Panel B: Characteristics of the partner firm only 
    (4) (5) (6) 
0.074 0.023 0.038  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.027)***  (0.033)  (0.035) 
0.211 -0.091 -0.298  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.344)  (0.386)  (0.451) 
0.126 0.144 0.058  (10)  Count of partner's prior alliances in all disease 
fields  (log)  (0.081) (0.092) (0.096) 
0.018 -0.071  0.098  (11)  Partner has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.190) (0.195) (0.208) 
0.079 0.103 0.072  (12) Partner's  valuation  (log)
1,2 
(0.048) (0.052)**  (0.058) 
-0.264 -0.162 -0.329  (13)  Partner is biotech firm 
(0.200) (0.229) (0.260) 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N  N Y 
  Observations  566 534 534 
 Pseudo  R
2  0.16 0.27 0.14 
Notes: 
1 in December 2006 US dollars 
2 For publicly listed firms, market valuation at end of prior quarter; for private firms, post-money value at end of last 
financing round (if occurred within past 12 months) 
3 Only available to extent disclosed in SEC filings     28 
  Panel C: Other alliance terms only 
   (7)     
0.048    (14)  Upfront payments ($M)
1,3 
(0.025)*    
0.082    (15)  Equity payments ($M)
1,3 
(0.036)**    
0.051    (16)  Milestone payments ($M)
1,3 
(0.037)    
-0.474    (17) License  is  worldwide 
(0.216)**    
1.359    (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.199)***     
0.193    (19)  Parties engage in joint R&D collaboration 
(0.143)    
-0.104    (20)  Biotech to do R&D prior to clinical trials 
(0.147)    
0.329    (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.160)**    
-0.160    (22)  Partner takes minority equity stake in biotech 
(0.277)    
-0.266    (23)  Biotech manufactures product for use or sale by 
partner (0.199)     
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N    
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N    
 Observations  566     
 Pseudo  R
2 0.27     
   
  Panel D: Full regression (only selected regressors shown) 
   (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.010 -0.023 -0.059  (1)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same disease 
field as the alliance  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.028)** 
0.633 0.669 1.151  (2)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.321)**  (0.351)*  (0.475)** 
-0.477 -0.457 -1.145  (3)  Years since founding (log) 
(0.167)*** (0.167)*** (0.542)** 
0.543 0.555 0.487  (5)  Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
(0.181)*** (0.199)*** (0.249)* 
0.114 0.112 0.135  (7) Biotech's  valuation  (log)
1,2 
(0.054)** (0.057)** (0.072)* 
0.034 0.023 0.065  (8)  Count of partner's concurrent alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.043) 
-0.270 -0.051  0.123  (9)  Proportion of partner's concurrent alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance  (0.433)  (0.462)  (0.627) 
0.040 0.046 0.071  (14)  Upfront payments ($M)
1,3 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.034)** 
0.079 0.081 0.094  (15)  Equity payments ($M)
1,3 
(0.039)** (0.040)** (0.056)* 
1.364 1.456 1.816  (18)  Biotech retains rights to participate in clinical 
development (0.213)***  (0.246)***  (0.319)*** 
0.293 0.293 0.529  (21)  Biotech to do R&D related to clinical trials 
(0.157)* (0.164)* (0.210)** 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N Y Y 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-founding, 
and year-of-signing dummies 
N  N Y 
 Observations  565  533  515 29 
 Pseudo  R
2 0.34  0.37  0.48 
Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 30 
 
Table 4: Biotech’s Subsequent Commercialization Activity (Probit) 
  Dependent variable: Biotech firm markets product in alliance disease field within 5 years (d) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
Full sample 
(1992-2006) 
Sample without truncation 
(1992-2001) 
0.439 0.202 0.640 0.560  (1)  Biotech retains rights to co-promote the 
alliance product  (0.194)** (0.233)  (0.240)***  (0.300)* 
 0.050   0.138  (2)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in same 
disease field as the alliance    (0.027)*    (0.048)*** 
 0.222   -0.792  (3)  Proportion of biotech's prior alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance    (0.458)    (0.593) 
 0.101   0.176  (4) Years since founding (log) 
 (0.355)   (0.401) 
 -0.064   -0.073  (5)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all 
disease fields (log)    (0.243)    (0.230) 
 -0.202   -0.482  (6) Biotech has prior co-promotion alliance (d) 
 (0.298)   (0.401) 
 -0.103   0.118  (7) Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
 (0.330)   (0.356) 
 0.098   -0.066  (8) Biotech's valuation (log) 
 (0.080)   (0.090) 
  Stage of commercialization dummies  N Y N Y 
  Constant  -1.751 -2.470 -1.696 -2.246 
    (0.107)*** (0.745)*** (0.120)*** (0.721)*** 
  Observations  566 565 389 388 
 Adjusted  R
2  0.02 0.24 0.04 0.25 
Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 31 
Table 5: Biotech’s Commercialization-Related Activity in Subsequent Alliances (OLS) 
 
Dependent variable:  Biotech retains co-
promotion rights in subs. 
alliance (d) 
Biotech retains co-
promotion rights in subs. 
alliance in same disease 
field (d) 
Proportion of subs. 
alliances where biotech is 
licensee 
Proportion of subs. 
alliances where biotech is 
licensee in same disease 
field 
    (1) (2) (5) (6) (3) (4) (7) (8) 
0.587 0.483 0.796 0.702 0.053 0.038 0.042 0.036  (1) Biotech retains rights to co-promote 
the  alliance  product  (0.046)*** (0.042)*** (0.038)*** (0.040)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)** 
 0.004   0.007   -0.001   0.002  (2) Count of biotech's prior alliances in 
same disease field as the alliance    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.001)    (0.002) 
 -0.026   0.152   0.028   0.044  (3) Proportion of biotech's prior alliances 
in same disease field as the alliance    (0.081)    (0.078)*    (0.023)    (0.031) 
 -0.206   0.045   -0.065   -0.033  (4)  Years since founding (log) 
 (0.101)**  (0.096)   (0.028)**  (0.038) 
 0.092   0.029   0.032   0.028  (5)  Count of biotech's prior alliances in all 
disease  fields  (log)   (0.024)***   (0.023)   (0.007)***   (0.009)*** 
 0.447   0.261   0.022   -0.006  (6)  Biotech has prior co-promotion 
alliance  (d)   (0.043)***   (0.040)***   (0.012)*   (0.016) 
 0.051   0.041   -0.066   -0.047  (7)  Biotech is publicly listed (d) 
 (0.047)   (0.045)   (0.013)***   (0.018)*** 
 0.001   0.009   0.020   0.011  (8) Valuation  (log) 
 (0.014)   (0.013)   (0.004)***   (0.005)** 
  Stage of commercialization, year-of-
founding, and year-of-signing dummies
N Y N Y N Y N Y 
 Disease-field  fixed  effects  N  N  N Y N  N  N Y 
  Constant  0.413 1.080 0.204 -0.502  0.130 0.181 0.097 0.128 
    (0.021)*** (0.386)*** (0.017)*** (0.365) (0.006)***  (0.108)*  (0.007)***  (0.144) 
  Observations  566 565 566 565 566 565 566 565 
 Adjusted  R
2  0.22 0.28 0.46 0.66 0.03 0.30 0.08 0.19 
Standard errors (clustered by biotech firm) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 